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Abstract

Network economic analysis provides an important and intuitive explanation of racial inequality. In short,
Whiteness is Microsoft's Windows operating system, or the QWERTY keyboard, or the standard (nonmetric) measurement system, and difficult to dislodge for many of the same reasons. Network effects explain
how the establishment of a dominant market standard 1) can be contingent on historical context, 2) does not
necessarily derive from superior intrinsic merit, and 3) exhibits strong self-reinforcing characteristics that can
maintain the dominance of the standard in perpetuity, even in the absence of any explicit or conscious
determination to maintain it. All of these factors are present with regard to the economic and cultural
dominance of Whiteness in the United States. Whiteness works like a network standard in three important
ways: 1) increasing returns to scale arising from communication standards drive markets toward a single
dominant racial standard; 2) various kinds of positive feedback in complementary markets make the
dominance of the Whiteness standard sticky, or resistant to change; and 3) the establishment of Whiteness as
the dominant racial standard is due to historical events rather than to any inherent or natural qualities. This
insight casts new light on mainstream explanations of racial inequality, supporting the critique that: 1) current
racial inequality is not the result of unequal merit, but is the legacy of history; and 2) no racist intent or
conspiracy is required for this inequality to continue - rather, specific intent and determination is required to
dislodge it.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Essay I demonstrate that a network economic analysis of race
provides an important and intuitive explanation of racial inequality. In
short, Whiteness1 is Microsoft’s Windows operating system, or the
QWERTY keyboard, or the standard (non-metric) measurement system,
and it is difficult to dislodge for many of the same reasons. Network
effects explain how (1) the establishment of a dominant market standard
can be contingent on historical context, and it is not necessarily derived
from superior intrinsic merit, and (2) a dominant standard exhibits strong
self-reinforcing characteristics that can maintain the dominance of the
standard in perpetuity, even in the absence of any explicit or conscious
determination to maintain it. All of these factors are present with regard to
the economic and cultural dominance of Whiteness in the United States.
This insight casts new light on mainstream explanations of racial
inequality, supporting the critique that (1) current racial inequality is not
the result of unequal “merit,” but is the legacy of history, and (2) no racist
intent or conspiracy is required for this inequality to continue. Rather,
specific intent and determination is required to dislodge it.
We live in an age of liberal economic thought. Not only have the
totalitarian socialist countries either fallen or made significant concessions
to the power of free markets, but the country most devoted to individualism
and free-market capitalism, the United States, remains standing as the only
remaining superpower.2 The dominant narrative of modern history seems
clear: free markets won.
Moreover, we recently experienced the longest, strongest, unbroken
period of economic growth in modern history, and although parts of the
economy are weaker than others, the current recession has been relatively
mild.3 Americans are to be forgiven, then, for imagining that these
immutable lessons of history are simply to be absorbed. For example, the
title of Francis Fukuyama’s book, The End of History and the Last Man,4 is
1. I capitalize “White” and “Whiteness” throughout, on the premise that these terms
are not natural, objective descriptions of a biological characteristic but instead represent a
socially and culturally constructed identity category, much like religious or national
affiliations, and therefore should be capitalized. See discussion infra notes 142-47.
2. See SAMIR AMIN, OBSOLESCENT CAPITALISM: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS OF GLOBAL
DISORDER 81 (2003) (discussing President Bush’s declaration that the United States is the
only remaining superpower that is willing to create a “new international order”).
3. See President Bill Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union (2000) (“We begin the new century with over twenty million new jobs;
the fastest economic growth in more than thirty years; the lowest unemployment rates in
thirty years; the lowest poverty rates in twenty years; the lowest African American and
Hispanic unemployment rates on record; the first back-to-back surpluses in forty-two years;
and next month, American will achieve the longest period of economic growth in our entire
history.”).
4. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xii-xiii (1993).
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meant to suggest that humanity has discovered the appropriate political
ideology for perpetual self-governance and social order.5 Free-market
liberal democracies are the answer.6 While there might still be subsidiary
social issues to address and fine-tuning to do, the basic debate is over. We
no longer need to entertain serious ideological debate regarding the
fundamental structure of government. Resistance is futile.
On the ground, the effects of this kind of thinking are palpable. The
wealth and income gaps between the very rich and the rest of the world
grows unabated7 and unabashedly.8 Both the winners and the losers accept
the uneven distribution of goods as being their just desserts.9 After all, the
impartial market is presumed to weigh the relative merits without regard to
status or historical context and determine the outcome. We reserve our
disdain for those who presume to advocate government intervention in the
market and unfairly seek special, unearned privileges or advantages for
themselves.10
For those who seek racial justice, the intellectual and cultural hegemony
of this kind of economic thinking is not a welcome development.11
According to neoclassical economic doctrine, (1) government need only
prevent the exercise of the lingering vestiges of irrational racism, although
even this might unnecessarily impede the self-correcting features of the
5. See Sherman A. Jackson, Shari’Ah, Democracy, and the Modern Nation-State:
Some Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, and Pluralism, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 88, 89 n.5
(2003) (stating that in The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama suggests that
“Western Capitalism and democracy have now emerged as the final form” of human
democracy).
6. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at xii-xiv (believing that humanity will ultimately
practice liberal democracy and stating, “[L]iberal principles in economics—the ‘free
market’—have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material
prosperity, both in industrially developed countries and in countries that had been, at the
close of World War II, part of the impoverished”).
7. See, e.g., MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 29 (1995) (stating that in the United
States twenty percent of the population earns forty-three percent of all income while the
poorest one-fifth earn four percent of the total income).
8. See, e.g., DINESH D’SOUZA, THE VIRTUE OF PROSPERITY 64-69 (2000) (discussing
economist Edward Wolff’s assertion that eighty-five percent of the nation’s wealth increase
between 1983 and 2000 went to the top one percent of wealth individuals, and the remaining
fifteen percent of new wealth went to the next nine percent of wealth holders).
9. See Kurt Finsterbusch, The Social Impact of Scarcity, in THE COMING AGE OF
SCARCITY: PREVENTING MASS DEATH AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 144,
154 (Michael N. Dobkowski & Isidor Walliman eds., 1998) (stating that even losers support
the system because they hope to eventually win and gain something from economic growth).
10. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133,
156 (1994) (discussing rent-seeking by racial groups, which “refers to efforts of people to
secure laws that convey monopoly power and profits upon themselves”).
11. See Richard Delgado, The Tales of White Folk: Doctrine, Narrative, and the
Reconstruction of Racial Reality, The Rodrigo Chronicles: Conversations about America
and Race, 84 CAL. L. REV. 377, 408-09 (1996) (arguing that legal economists do not
appreciate the role of racial bias in shaping market forces, and noting that critical race
theorists do not have as much faith that the market will eliminate racism).
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market;12 and (2) any remaining racial disparities are either fading
historical vestiges or fair, color-blind results.13 Under this paradigm,
affirmative action is seen as an unjust or even racist intervention in the
market,14 which hurts everyone, including the supposed beneficiaries. This
view has become so widespread and conventional that I have observed
many White law students confronted with a defense of affirmative action
respond not with resistance, but with pity, bolstered by a well-founded
confidence that affirmative action will not long be a significant threat to
them in the real world.15 The recent claims by African Americans for
reparations for slavery are met with hostility and similar dismissal: what
possible relevance could historical slavery have on the failure of minorities
to thrive in today’s merit-based marketplace?16
Critical Race Theorists in particular have identified traditional economic
analysis, and the methodological individualism that underlies classical
economic theory, as the enemy. “Race crits” have deployed persuasive and
empathy-provoking personal narratives,17 detailed factual historical
research,18 and sophisticated theoretical analysis19 to delineate systems,
12. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 29-31 (1992) (“Freedom of contract is the position that results when
the employment discrimination laws are removed, and it yields vastly different results from
the removal of all legal restraints on aggressive action.”).
13. Id. at 139 (arguing that perfect competition eliminates discrimination).
14. See Cooter, supra note 10, at 156 (stating that formal laws actually sustain
discriminatory norms because these laws interfere with the market forces’ ability to
“disintegrate” discrimination).
15. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309-10 (2003) (expressing the
expectation that affirmative action will no longer be necessary in twenty-five years). See
also, e.g., Robert J. Bliwise, Reaffirming Affirmative Action—From Courtroom to
Classroom, Duke Mag., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu
/dukemag/issues/091003/action1.html (quoting white Duke student Jonathan Bigelow’s
comment, “I have not observed any explicit resentment from white students on campus . . .
And Duke students probably have little to gripe about from a personal perspective, since we
were all admitted.”).
16. See, e.g., David Boyle, Unsavory White Omissions: A Review of Uncivil Wars, 105
W. VA. L. REV. 655, 657 (2003) (disagreeing with David Horowitz’s book entitled, Uncivil
Wars: The Controversy over Reparations for Slavery, which argues that paying reparations
to descendants of former slaves is unnecessary and burdensome on taxpayers who never
owned slaves, and arguing that Horowitz ignores the unsavory omissions of Whites in the
area of African-American justice).
17. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (detailing the history of racial oppression through various fables);
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) (using an
autobiographical essay to depict the author’s struggle with race, gender, and class).
18. See generally MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002) (analyzing how United States foreign policy efforts abroad
were impacted by the American Civil Rights Movement because, as the United States
claimed to be the human rights leader in the world, it received scrutiny from other countries,
including communist regimes).
19. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE xiiixiv (1996) (arguing that Whiteness is changeable and ultimately social, based on an analysis
of various cases in which state and federal courts developed the concept of Whiteness).
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cultures, and ideologies of racial oppression that persist, and that demand a
modern remedy. Yet a simple and powerful foundational economic
premise—that individuals make independent, self-interested decisions20
that distribute benefits efficiently according to the collective valuation of
market actors21—works together with a virtuous, conscious determination
to foreswear irrational, intentional, racial discrimination to produce a blunt
counter to all of the persuasive power that race crits can muster: “We’re
not racists and we don’t discriminate, so any unequal conditions reflect the
impartial judgment of the market. Theorizing about racial oppression is a
distraction, and counterproductive to true equality.”22
There is, however, something new on the economic front. We are
moving into an information economy, we are told, which has different
economic rules.23 Strikingly, the new “network economics,” which is
driving the creation of vast new fortunes and industries, breaks some of the
standard economic assumptions we have learned to profess.24 Economists
have noticed that in such a market, fair competition based on traditional
understandings of merit does not always occur.25
A brief and familiar example will illustrate the point. Microsoft’s
Windows has become the undisputed dominant product in the market for
personal computer operating systems.26 The claim of network economics is
that this is not, or at least not necessarily, because Windows is the best
operating system around. Instead, Microsoft dominates because: (1) the
more people there are who own Windows, the more attractive it is for
others to own it;27 (2) the more Windows users there are, the more likely it
20. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 85-86 (17th
ed. 2001) (discussing the theory of demand and utility, where consumers make decisions
based on personal satisfaction and other rational consumer behavior).
21. See, e.g., id. at 28 (discussing dominance in market economies, where consumers
ultimately determine, through market forces, where resources are channeled).
22. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 29899 (1990) (arguing against the general notion that society does not discriminate and instead
stating that the presence and power of unconscious racism is embedded in every aspect of
society).
23. See KEVIN KELLY, NEW RULES FOR THE NEW ECONOMY: 10 RADICAL STRATEGIES
FOR A CONNECTED WORLD 1 (1998) (noting that the emerging new economic order has “its
own distinct opportunities and pitfalls . . . those who play by the new rules will prosper,
while those who ignore them will not”).
24. See id. at 94 (explaining the argument that with expanding networks and
technological advancement, distance, place, real estate, and geography are no longer
relevant).
25. See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 117 (1989) (finding that the market sometimes adopts
inferior technologies as increasing-return technologies compete in the market system).
26. See KELLY, supra note 23, at 4 (stating that Microsoft is now the role model for the
new economy, and recognizing that it is the “highest-valued company” in the world).
27. See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry:
A Market Lock-in Model of
Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 732-33 (2000) (noting that as more programs become
compatible with Microsoft, future users are more likely to use Windows because they prefer
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is that more software applications will be offered by other firms that run on
Windows;28 (3) the more firms there are that use Windows, the more useful
it becomes to learn Windows skills;29 (4) the more people there are in the
world using Windows, the more useful it is to operate a system with disks,
protocols, and file formats that are compatible with Windows;30 and (5) the
more Windows applications, Windows-trained personnel, and Windowscompatible systems there are in the world, the more inexorable the
conclusion that one must own a computer system that runs on Windows,
even if you think it is an impossibly buggy and sluggish system. Network
economics makes Windows an indispensable product.31
In markets that exhibit network economic effects, there is no single
equilibrium regarding valuable products that the market will settle on.32
Instead, there are multiple available equilibria. These markets are
“tippy”33—one among perhaps several competing products or standards
will tend to achieve a dominant position, but any of them could be the
a broader array of software that is also compatible with other users).
28. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 501-02 (1998) (stating that Microsoft may even encourage
internet service providers to feature Microsoft’s Internet Explorer web browser thus making
it more difficult for users to use Netscape’s Navigator browser—Microsoft’s main
competitor). See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999)
(recognizing the significance of “The Applications Barrier to Entry,” which prevents any
Intel-compatible PC operating system, other than Microsoft’s, from gaining an edge in the
system).
29. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (discussing how Microsoft enjoys positive
network effects because, for example, corporate consumers want to use an operating system
that new employees are already familiar with, and academic consumers want to use software
that enables them to share files with colleagues more easily).
30. See id. at 15 (stating that only Microsoft’s Intel-compatible PC operating systems
will work with Intel-compatible PCs, which means that consumers who own Intelcompatible PC systems would incur substantial costs if they decided to switch to a non-Intel
compatible system).
31. See Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 733 (“Microsoft’s advantage may become
sufficiently large that other competitors cannot possibly catch up, and the leader’s dominant
position then becomes ‘locked into’ the market.”). Obviously these advantages can be
characterized as barriers to entry, giving Microsoft monopoly power, and giving rise to the
antitrust issues raised in numerous federal, state, and private actions against Microsoft in
recent years. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 506 (discussing the various
antitrust issues related to the network effects of Microsoft). However, in-depth analysis of
these issues is beyond the scope of this Essay. I note that the similarity between antitrust
and antidiscrimination laws has not gone unnoticed. Robert Cooter points out that
discrimination by social groups can resemble cartel behavior. See Cooter, supra note 10, at
153-54 (suggesting that such discrimination is inherently unstable). Cooter compares
disparate impact analysis in antidiscrimination law with the failed struggle against structural
monopolies in antitrust law, implying that this effort is equally in vain. Id.
32. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 496-97 (discussing the ebb and flow of
the market where system markets are prone to tipping, which is where one system pulls
ahead of rivals based on increased popularity once it has gained an initial advantage).
33. See KELLY, supra note 23, at 34 (charting the exponential gains associated with the
tipping point). For a popular treatment of consumer markets that “tip,” see generally
MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2000).
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product that achieves the dominant position, and their relative features do
not particularly determine which of them it is.34 The network benefits are
so powerful that, given a head start and a broad user base, the market will
accelerate toward a standard without discriminating as to which standard it
turns out to be.35 Thus, contingent, historical factors, rather than inherent
value, determine market domination.36 It matters more, perhaps, that Bill
Gates dropped out of college early37 than it does that Apple’s Macintosh
operating system was, at least early on, and arguably even now, a superior
product.38 While certain aspects of the above portrayal are disputed by
some,39 the existence of network advantages are widely accepted and
viewed as being within the economic paradigm.40
Positive feedback occurs whenever communication or interoperability
requires that a standard be adopted, and their effects are not new.41
Telephones, the gauge of railroad tracks, and even language42 are examples
of markets in which a standard is adopted for historically contingent
reasons, and then get “locked in,”43 because the same effects which made

34.
35.
36.
37.

See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 497.
Id.
See Arthur, supra note 25, at 127.
See JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE: BILL GATES AND THE MAKING
OF THE MICROSOFT EMPIRE 10 (1993); see also Charles M. Gastle & Susan Boughs,
Microsoft III and the Metes and Bounds of Software Design and Technological Tying
Doctrine, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7 n.132 (2001), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue1/v6i1a07Gastle.html (on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that the advent of
the personal computer prompted “Bill Gates to drop out of Harvard”).
38. See STEVEN LEVY, INSANELY GREAT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MACINTOSH, THE
COMPUTER THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING 7 (1994) (arguing that Macintosh “is the most
important consumer product,” which will change how we view computers).
39. See, e.g., STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS &
MICROSOFT (1999). Skeptics of the significance of network effects typically argue either that
significant competition nonetheless occurs in the establishment of network standards with
benefits for consumers such as low-priced cell phones or software or that the barriers to
entry are exaggerated. See William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 577, 578 (1999) (stating that network effects, on their own, do not
make the emergence of a “single-firm” monopoly more likely, nor do they “always create
high barriers to entry”). However, my claim is not that the dominance of Whiteness is
inefficient, or that it produces monopoly profits, but that it exhibits network effects. It is
unlikely that any of the critics of the recent focus on network effects would argue that a
skilled Macintosh sales person faces a level playing field.
40. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 484 (stating, “That network effects exist
to a greater or lesser degree in various markets is uncontroversial . . . ”).
41. See Arthur, supra note 25, at 127 (describing the importance of historical effects
when analyzing the evolution of the market).
42. See David G. Post, “The Free Use of Our Faculties”: Thomas Jefferson,
Cyberspace, and the Language of Social Life, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 407, 409-12 (2001)
(relating the prospect of decentralized governance of the Internet to the historical debate
over the control of the development of language).
43. See Arthur, supra note 25, at 116-17 (discussing how certain companies may corner
the market if they can gain an early lead at the outset).
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the market tip toward a standard also work to make the standard “sticky,”44
or resistant to changing to an alternative standard.
The potential implications of network economics for race theory are
significant.45 The network economic theory, which is widely accepted,46
posits that (1) contingent, historical context is important in determining
market dominance; (2) a market might tip toward a particular standard for
reasons other than the inherent merit or value of that standard; (3) once
adopted, a dominant standard might become locked in and sticky; (4) the
market might produce this outcome even where there is no single firm or
entity guiding the maintenance of the standard; and (5) these conditions
adhere in markets in which communication and interoperability are
essential features. The deep context, the systemic and coercive power, the
unconscious47 and self-reinforcing behaviors, and the persistence that
Critical Race Theorists have been insisting on all along with regard to
racism are all here. The relevant markets, in which communication and
interoperability are essential, can be the market for employees, for retail
customers, or the market for cultural and social norms among human
beings, and the dominant racial standard in each of these markets is
Whiteness.
The remainder of this Essay is simply an exploration of this idea. This
Essay sets forth the basic argument that Whiteness works like a network
standard in three important ways. First, network effects operate in markets
where communication and interoperability create increasing returns to
scale,48 which drives these markets toward a single, dominant standard.49
44. See id. (noting that a dominant technology in a system may lead to inflexibility).
45. See Margaret Chon, 1999-2000 Oliver Wendell Holmes Symposium and
Lectureship: The Market Place of Ideas in Cyberspace, Panel Discussion, 51 MERCER L.
REV. 859, 874-75 (2000) (commenting that white supremacy is “a bad idea that has a large
network base”); Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 762 (stating that the use of the LSAT in law
school admissions constitutes a locked-in standard imposed historically by Whites acting
intentionally as a racial cartel). But cf. Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1839, 1907 (1996) (dismissing the idea that network economics could support the
hiring of more than a token number of minority employees).
46. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28
CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1044-45 (1996) (arguing that the pressure toward standardization in
some markets seems indisputable).
47. See, e.g., JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 154-55 (1997) (arguing that unconscious
mental habits and stereotypes, among other unconscious acts, perpetuate discrimination
against Blacks); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (stating that
because of our shared historical and cultural heritage, which has been dominated by racism,
everyone is influenced by unconscious racism).
48. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 488-89 (noting that network markets
involve products that facilitate communication between users); see generally Arthur, supra
note 25, at 116 (analyzing the “dynamics of allocation” in our market system, which leads to
increasing returns).
49. See id. (arguing that a technology that gains a lead by chance in the market may
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In Part I, I explain that in significant respects, markets such as those for
employees and for cultural images of people, are examples of markets in
which the importance of communication and information tends to produce
a single racial standard. An important corollary of this analysis is that no
irrational, racist malice is necessary to create and maintain the dominance
of the racial standard. Only ordinary economic incentives are required.
Second, because of various forms of positive feedback, network markets
tend to “lock in” to the dominant standard, which proves “sticky,” or
difficult to change or penetrate. I describe in Part II how various
complementary goods and services support Whiteness and further
strengthen its dominance. In addition, a collective action problem makes it
costly for a firm or individual to switch standards unless everyone else does
at essentially the same time. Thus Whiteness tends to persist as a racial
standard. I argue that displacing Whiteness would require personal and
institutional retraining.
Third, the establishment of dominant standards in network markets is
“path-dependent,” that is, it is contingent on small events and historical
circumstance rather than optimal intrinsic features, utility, or merit. In Part
III I argue that the dominance of Whiteness in the economy is primarily
due to the history of the social and legal construction of Whiteness, rather
than to superior merit and open competition.
I.

WHITE NETWORK ECONOMICS: HOW WHITENESS WORKS AS A
NETWORK STANDARD

Economists have shown that certain goods, once established as a market
standard, reap network effects that enable them to dominate a market
persistently.50 Examples include telephones, personal computer operating
systems, and language.51
The central argument of this Part is that Whiteness operates as a racial
standard that provides network economic advantages. An important
consequence of this analysis is that the dominant and persistent nature of
network standards—rather than “merit”—explains current racial disparities.

eventually lock in the market, leaving other technologies effectively locked out).
50. See Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 742-49 (describing that as network markets grow
larger and more valuable, demand increases for the technology, which may lead to market
domination and standardization).
51. See id. at 733-34 (noting that network economics can be applied to various
networks including the network of the legal profession and the network of computer
systems, among many others).
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A. Network Economics and Standards
A brief introduction contrasting classical and network economics is in
order. For conventional goods following an ordinary downward-sloping
demand curve, consumers buy less of a commodity at higher prices.52 If
demand greatly exceeds supply, then the commodity will be exclusive to
the relatively few people willing to pay the high price it demands.
Generally, as the amount of a good consumed increases, the marginal
utility diminishes.53 As the marginal utility diminishes, the price the
marginal purchaser is willing to pay for each additional unit also decreases.
In other words, ordinary markets exhibit decreasing returns to scale on the
demand side.54 Thus the ordinary instruction to a job seeker is to make
oneself stand out, or to obtain rare skills to differentiate oneself from the
mass of others in the employment market. Similarly, cultural projects
become less valuable the more often they are reproduced.
Network economics turns that fundamental economic maxim on its head:
network goods exhibit increasing returns to scale on the demand curve.55
Consider the value of that archetypal network good, the telephone, if one
person owns the only one in existence. Since its purpose is communication
and there is no one on the other end of the line, a single telephone is
worthless. In the real world, however, a telephone is so valuable it is
considered an essential service, precisely because so many other people
have one and can be reached through it on the telephone network, but only
if one owns a telephone.56
This network value is only realized if your telephone can communicate
with other telephones through the network. This communication requires a
technical standard of some kind that each item must comply with in order
to function as a telephone. Because of increasing returns to scale, however,
competing standards fail— even if they are technically superior—if they
fail to attain a dominant position in the market. No one cares if you have
the ultimate communications gizmo (better than the telephone!) if everyone
else is, in fact, using the telephone. Thus network economies are driven
toward single, dominant standards.

52. See, e.g., SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 20, at 56 (demonstrating that fewer
goods would be bought at higher prices through supply and demand graphical analysis).
53. See, e.g., id. at 86-87 (defining marginal utility as the extra utility a consumer
receives from “the consumption of an additional unit of a commodity”).
54. See, e.g., id. at 89-90 (comparing the theory of marginal utility to the value of time
to the individual).
55. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 484.
56. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985) (using a similar example with personal
computers).
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Network economics analysis has been extended more broadly to markets
that do not involve the sale of goods.57 For instance, the use of a particular
language to communicate with others is behavior that exhibits network
effects.58 The ability to speak English is virtually useless unless there are
others who speak the same language. The more people there are who speak
English, the more valuable that ability is. English speakers share a
common technical communication standard—here, a set of words,
definitions, grammatical rules, and idioms—that allows them to
communicate with a great number of people. Thus one might expect that a
dominant language standard would develop. Indeed, some claim that
despite intense cultural and nationalist opposition, English is becoming the
de facto worldwide language standard, especially for business, scientific,
and tourism purposes.59
A product need not involve direct communications to produce network
effects. Increasing returns can result if products are merely functionally
compatible.60 An operating system like Microsoft Windows will benefit a
user even if nobody else owns (or leases) it. However, its value increases
as the number of users increase. People can share documents with others
using the same word processing software, or share disks with other people
using the same operating system. Here, the technical standard involved
enables not communication but compatibility with regard to skills,
applications, and work product.61
57. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 491.
58. Id. at 489-91.
59. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 347 (1992).
60. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 424 (stressing the need for products of
different firms within a network to be compatible).
61. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining
that, because of Microsoft’s monopoly over the PC operating system and the internet
browser market, its product is valuable to the owner). Legal scholarship in this area has
also, for the most part, related to antitrust implications. See, e.g., LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS,
supra note 39, at 247-49 (recounting the origins of Microsoft’s antitrust cases); David S.
Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, 10
ANTITRUST 36 (1996) (noting that only a few entities tend to dominate “Network
industries,” thus giving cause for antitrust concerns); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28,
at 500-23 (claiming that existing antitrust laws adequately address issues raised by
networks); Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the
Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 87-88 (2001) (discussing how networks affect entry
into an industry). In the antitrust context, the issue is generally whether network effects
comprise a barrier to entry into a market, resulting in inefficient monopoly profits and the
exclusion of more efficient competitors. See, e.g., LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 39,
at 128 (demonstrating that network standards can be efficient); see also Werden, supra, at
97-108 (considering whether network effects constitute economic barriers to entry).
Scholars applying network economic analysis to other areas of law similarly focus on
efficiency. See Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 734 (claiming that admissions standards in the
legal education market are inefficient). I do not contest the claim that standards in network
economies are efficient. However, I assume for the purposes of this paper that market
efficiency does not justify racial subordination. It may be that we need not shed a tear for
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B. A Dominant Racial Standard
Whiteness is a network standard in two respects. First, it can operate as
an actual technical standard that limits access to networks. If you do not
comply with the standard, you are completely excluded from working or
communicating with those who are using it. You may as well be a
telegraph operator trying to make someone’s telephone ring.
Non-White people are not, of course, literally excluded in this way.
With the demise of de jure racial discrimination, as well as the universal
condemnation of intentional racism, Whiteness is not generally a formal
requirement for any position or function.
One instance in which Whiteness may be considered a technical standard
might be when casting an actor for a part that is seen as inflexibly requiring
a White person, such as Hamlet or George Washington. A non-White actor
will never be able to meet the technical standard of being White.62
Second, and more broadly, Whiteness is a dominant network standard in
the sense that it is the default race. People are presumed to be White unless
otherwise stated.
Thus the “standard” judge, teacher, student, or
customer—the standard person—is imagined to be White. In particular,
the standard employee in many cases is presumed to be White. Although
an employer could overcome this presumption when faced with a nonWhite applicant, it would nonetheless be an initial presumption burdening
the applicant.
Absent economic advantages, overcoming this second type of “default”
standard might simply require an employer with flexibility and
imagination. The extent to which there might be network racial advantages
depends in part on the extent to which non-White employees can
communicate and work with White employees. Thus the following
analysis focuses on ways in which the ability to communicate across racial
lines might be impeded. If people of different races are unable to
communicate, then they are, in a sense, technically incapable of becoming
part of the same network.
Note that my example of the first type of standard described above—a
racial requirement in casting actors for parts—is not truly a technical
requirement in the sense that it would be physically impossible for a nonWhite actor to play a part. A director with enough imagination might
overcome this standard, although to be feasible, this flexibility would also
the superior but unused Beta videotapes, Macintosh computers and Netscape Web browsers.
I presume that meritorious but unemployed people of color deserve greater sympathy.
62. See Neil Gotanda, Asian Americans and the “Miss Saigon Syndrome”, in ASIAN
AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087, 1087-88 (Hyungchan Kim ed., 1992) (noting that actors exhibiting Whiteness are nonetheless welcome to
perform non-White roles).
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have to be shared by the producer and the audience. Similarly, a manager
making an employment decision contrary to the default standard must
overcome not only personal reservations, but must also keep in mind the
possible reservations of customers, coworkers, and superiors.63 Thus the
two kinds of standards operate along a spectrum of flexibility: the least
flexible preferences for Whiteness operate as a technical standard, while
more flexible preferences for Whiteness operate merely as a default
presumption.
Either way, the Whiteness standard means that the ordinary economic
advice to “stand out” is reversed with regard to race. Non-White applicants
are well advised not to try to stand out by emphasizing their racial
differences.64 Employers, recognizing the incompatibility of the non-White
applicant with the dominant White standard, are likely less inclined to hire
non-White individuals. Advertising agencies or movie and television
producers might be advised not to develop or cast non-White lead
characters or models. This reversal of the ordinary advice is a hint that
network economics may be involved.65
The ordinary discourse regarding racial identity is that because race is, or
should be, irrelevant to employment, employees should not “inject” race
into a situation by being outspoken about their racial identity.66 Note that
White employees are not seen as introducing race issues no matter how
White—say, suburban and preppy—they present themselves. By viewing
Whiteness as a racial standard, we see that in this discourse it is not race
that is irrelevant. It is Blackness (or Asian-ness, etc.) that is irrelevant. In
other words, race is irrelevant only so long as one meets the default
standard of being White.
C. Interoperability: Communication and Culture
In the information economy, the ability to communicate—to
meaningfully receive and transmit information—has become recognized as
a crucial economic asset.67 That asset is embodied most significantly in
63. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., 685 F. Supp. 224, 225 (N.D. Ala. 1988)
(referring to a supervisor who was concerned about how it would look to have “a n—
foreman with all my white customers”).
64. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719-20 (2001) (emphasizing the performative nature of race within an
institution; individual employees of color must choose how to perform their race in order to
be racially palatable to their employers).
65. Critical Race Theorists have noted that the “transparency” of Whiteness is the
source of much of what has come to be called “White privilege.” See BARBARA J. FLAGG,
WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW 65 (1998)
(analyzing Whites’ reliance on Blacks for explanations of racism).
66. Id.
67. Kevin Kelly goes so far as to insist that in the new economy, “[t]he net is our
future.” KELLY, supra note 23, at 9.
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people.
Workers are now information and knowledge brokers.68
Especially in this context, race makes a difference. First, race often
correlates strongly with verbal communication style, dialect, or accent.69
Second, race correlates with distinct cultural references and beliefs,70 which
facilitate trust, social comfort, and communication.71 Finally, race itself
communicates because racial subjects are perceived through a complex
series of racial images regarding competence, beliefs, and attitudes, which
comprise cultural and social norms that compete for dominance.72
Whether a market tips towards a dominant standard depends in part on
the demand for variety.73 If consumers prefer to buy unique jewelry, a
dominant standard will not develop. One might expect that in markets
where demand for variety is high, the need for interoperability will be low.
There is no need for one’s jewelry to match that of others. Hence, high
demand for variety and low economies of scale tend against tipping a
market towards a dominant standard.74 The recent emphasis on racial
diversity as an important value can be seen as an effort to counterbalance
the efficiency pressure towards racial homogeneity.75 However, if the
preference for racial variety is weak or vague, it will not overcome the
network effects of the strong communication function.
1.

Verbal communication: language, dialect, and accent
To the extent that employees must communicate with colleagues,
customers or clients, and employees at other firms or agencies, they serve a
communicative function. If race correlates with factors that affect the
ability to communicate effectively, then network effects may exist.
68. ROBERT B. REICH, THE FUTURE OF SUCCESS 60-62 (2001).
69. See discussion infra at Part I.C.1.
70. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1,
56-59 (1991) (emphasizing that race cannot be viewed as distinct from “culture, community,
and consciousness”).
71. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 3-12 (1995) (arguing that only societies with a high
degree of social trust will be able to compete).
72. See Gotanda, supra note 70, at 56 (stating that a color-blind assimilationist ideal
neglects positive aspects of race, particularly cultural components, and that failure to
recognize this key aspect of race amounts to cultural genocide); see Lawrence, supra note
47, at 322-23 (asserting that racism in America remains dominant in part due to the
unconscious transmission of racially discriminatory attitudes to children through adults’
behavior); Reginald Leamon Robinson, White Cultural Matrix and the Language of
Nonverbal Advertising in Housing Segregation: Toward an Aggressive Theory of Liability,
25 CAP. U. L. REV. 101, 120 (1996) (defining “culture” as a system of beliefs, symbols, and
rules through which people organize and understand the world in which they live).
73. Gotanda, supra note 70, at 56.
74. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1762 (2003) (emphasizing that due to the impact of antidiscrimination laws and changing social norms regarding diversity, the incentive for a
homogenous environment is minimal).
75. See id. at 1788 (criticizing the tendency of employers to promote homogeneity to
realize “truth, fairness, and loyalty” in the workplace).
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Consider at the most fundamental and direct level of analysis, actual
language barriers. A common language is a communications standard that
operates as a network standard.76 It would be difficult to argue that
someone who actually could not communicate with others because of a
language barrier was not disadvantaged in the workplace.77 Certainly
language, inextricably entwined with identity and culture,78 correlates at
least partly with national origin and race.79 Whether or not this effect is
appropriate or fair, my only point here is that the English language standard
is important in employment, and has the effect of excluding non-English
speakers.80
A slightly less direct example of a racial communication barrier in
network markets is Black English.81 An illustrative scenario appears in the
movie “Airplane!”82 In an exaggerated African-American dialect, two
Black passengers speak to each other and to the confused White flight

76. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 489.
77. But see Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Anti-discrimination Law, and
a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1377-78 (1991)
(questioning the assumption that accents necessarily disadvantage speakers when seeking
employment).
78. But see STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 258 (1994) (challenging the myth
that ethnicity plays a predominant role in an individual’s ability to learn a specific
language); Jill Gaulding, Against Common Sense: Why Title VII Should Protect Speakers of
Black English, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 652-54 (1998) (discussing the intrinsic and
biological basis of the language function, and asserting that the lack of proper education in
standard English results in blacks using different speech).
79. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship
Between Language Law Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 145, 146-47 (1997) (identifying the causal link between state OfficialEnglish laws and private attacks on non-government speech); Robert S. Chang & Keith
Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1395,
1409-12 (1998) (discussing language disputes involving Asian-Americans); Allison M.
Dussias, Waging War With Words: Native Americans’ Continuing Struggle Against the
Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 923-28 (1999); Grace A. Pasigan,
Sign Language: Colonialism and the Battle Over Text, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 625, 63641 (1997). See also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991) (contemplating
the correlation of race and language).
80. See Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Language Minorities:
Forgotten Victims of
Discrimination, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747, 759 (1997) (claiming language discrimination is
a growing factor in employment discrimination). Much of the literature in this area
discusses Official English or English-Only laws. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 79, at 14647; Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the
Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1347, 1349 (1997); Perea, supra note 59, at 355 (claiming that language has often been the
root of discrimination against non-English speakers). Generally the importance of a single
language standard for genuine employment-related communication purposes is not
contested. However, these laws also regulate the use of language in settings where the
employer’s interest is less direct, and they often arise in circumstances in which a particular
ethnic group is targeted. See Chang & Aoki, supra note 79, at 1409-12; Pasigan, supra note
79, at 627.
81. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 652.
82. AIRPLANE! (Paramount Pictures 1980).
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attendant. A “translation” is presented in “Standard English”83 subtitles
along the bottom of the screen. The joke is that the passengers might as
well be speaking a foreign language considering their ability to
communicate with the attendant. A fellow passenger—an elderly,
distinguished-looking White woman—offers to help, saying, “I speak
Jive.” She proceeds to “translate” the Black passengers’ requests, and then
replies to them in the same exaggerated dialect, complete with “attitude.”
The incongruity of the White woman’s appearance and the language
coming out of her mouth is another joke that plays on the cultural and class
connotations of race.
While this example is exaggerated, the point remains that people
speaking English communicate in racially identifiable ways that are not
always easily understood across racial lines. Thus, at the simplest level,
employers might hire Whites because they tend to communicate better with
White customers, other White employees, and the White employees of
other firms, because they speak the same dialect. This serves as a technical
standard.
The debate over Black English, or Ebonics, for example, often comes
down to whether or not to recognize inherent value in having a distinct
American dialect.84 Proponents note that African-American dialect has
identifiable rules of grammar and syntax, sometimes traced to African
roots,85 and thus ought to be recognized86 and even studied as a true dialect,
rather than being dismissed as simply “bad English.”87 This is a merit
argument. The proponents are claiming that in substantive, objective
terms, Black English is a coherent and inherently valid language of its own,
and therefore should be given respect and recognition equal to that given to
Standard English.
The pragmatic response, of course, is that it simply does not matter
whether Ebonics has a cognizable and inherently valid structure. In order
to participate in the broader world, one must learn to speak the standard

83. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 658 (discussing “Standard Language Ideology” as a
bias toward a homogenous spoken language imposed by dominant institutions); see also
ROSINA LIPPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN ACCENT:
LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY, AND
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (1997) (claiming dominant institutions play a
lead role in establishing a dominant language).
84. See, e.g., Lori Olszewski, Oakland Schools OK Black English, S.F. CHRON., Dec.
19,
1996,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?
file=/chronicle/archive/1996/12/19/MN11848.DTL.
85. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 662-73 (citing the Linguistic Society of America’s
unanimous support for the Oakland School Board’s decision to recognize Black English).
86. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 190 (1999) (raising the possibility of Asian-Americans aiding
in resistance to English-Only laws).
87. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 642 (observing that most school administrators
equate Black English with poor grammar).
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American dialect or risk being unable to communicate effectively.88
Network effects drive culture toward a single dominant dialect and
therefore devalue competing standards.
The extent to which this language standard serves as a racial barrier to
workforce participation89 depends, of course, on a racial generalization.
Most African-Americans are of course capable of speaking Standard
English and do so. Note that when African-Americans speak Standard
English, they do not “sound Black.” Thus the dialect analysis can extend to
instances where, rather than prohibiting communication entirely, dialect
serves instead to identify the race of the speaker. Studies have shown that
people can identify the race of an unseen speaker—say, over the phone—
with a high degree of accuracy.90
Commentators who have focused on this as linguistic profiling91 or
accent discrimination92 seem to be describing a subtle way to effect oldfashioned intentional discrimination: the listener determines the race of the
caller and then discriminates based on racist stereotypes.93 This method
might also be used to identify and discriminate against callers based not
only on race but also on sexual orientation, and national or regional origin,
i.e., immigrants and Southerners.
While these forms of invidious discrimination undoubtedly occur, a
network economic analysis might produce an account of incentives for
accent discrimination, even in the absence of racist intent or bias. For
example, a listener who is expecting, or is simply accustomed to hearing, a
White voice on the telephone might be slightly surprised or disturbed to
hear a non-White speaker instead.94 This would be an example of
88. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 50 (2002).
89. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 643-46 (reviewing studies showing that Black
English speakers are at a disadvantage in every aspect of employment).
90. See, e.g., Lis Wiehl, “Sounding Black” in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial
Sterotyping, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 185 (2002) (citing a Kentucky court case where
the court held a police officer was reasonable in determining a suspect was Black on the
basis of the sound of his voice); see also Rhea v. State, 147 S.W. 463, 472-73 (Ark. 1912)
(upholding a conviction based on identified race of a White speaker’s voice); Clifford v.
Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Ky. 1999) (upholding a conviction based on a witness
identification of the race of a speaker as Black by his voice); Matsuda, supra note 77, at
1337 (suggesting that a prevailing prejudice against an accent is prone “to cause some
listeners to ‘turn off’ and not comprehend it”).
91. See Michael Erard, The Role of Profiling in American Society: Linguistic Profiling,
5 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 225, 228 (2003) (arguing that allowing witnesses to testify as to
the racial characteristics of a speaker’s voice embodies racial profiling).
92. See Matsuda, supra note 77, at 1350 (citing courts’ recognition of accent
discrimination); see also Gaulding, supra note 78, at 646 n.149 (referring to studies that
demonstrate employers believe a person with a Standard English accent, in addition to
having better grammar, is more likely to have other more desirable personality traits).
93. See Matsuda, supra note 77, at 1347.
94. Discussing his theory of racial stigmatization, Glenn Loury writes:
Everything depends, I am arguing, on racially biased social cognitions that cause
some situations to appear anomalous, disquieting, contrary to expectation, worthy
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Whiteness working as a default standard. The listener might, as a
consequence, feel more awkward or uncomfortable than one would if the
speaker was White. If the listener was unable or unwilling to overcome the
disturbance, or to understand the accented words, then this failure to meet
the racial norm in voice communication would work as a technical standard
to exclude an incompatible speaker—the speaker’s effectiveness at
communicating information, making a sale, establishing rapport, or
forming a social bond would be diminished.
A light accent does not interfere with “actual” communication.95 That is,
the listener understands the spoken words. However, communication
consists of much more than the transmission of words. Individuals also
communicate intent, meaning, and identity through gait, posture, facial
expression, physical proximity, and eye contact. Indeed, the entire range of
social context in which the communication takes place also influences the
transmission of meaning.96 These forms of communication may be
received peripherally or subconsciously, but affect the meaning
communicated. Thus, a more nuanced examination of effective interracial
communication must include at least a cursory review of broader avenues
of communication through cultural competence and racial stereotyping.
2.

Culture
To the extent that dialect, accent, and the social conventions that
comprise nonverbal forms of communication are determined by culture,
and culture is integral to communication, Whiteness constitutes a kind of
racial cultural literacy that is essential to communication.97 Thus, someone
might, on the basis of a brief phone interview, determine that the speaker

of further investigation, inconsistent with the natural order of things—while other
situations appear normal, about right, in keeping with what one might expect,
consistent with the social world as we know it.
LOURY, supra note 88, at 71.
95. On the other hand, I have observed that when listeners expect, perhaps on the basis
of race, not to understand the speaker’s speech, they become incapable of interpreting even
a slight accent. Thus, a White store clerk confronted with an Asian immigrant customer and
expecting to hear a “foreign” language fails to understand the customer’s lightly accented
English. Indeed, the listener’s attitude determines whether communication is successful.
The clerk’s complaint that it is “impossible” to communicate with Asian foreigners fulfills
itself. See Wiehl, supra note 90, at 194 (describing an experiment in which different
listeners of an identical speech recording matched with videotape footage of children of
different races assessed the speech differently for fluency and for being “standard”); see
also Matsuda, supra note 77, at 1376-79 (discussing “the problem of the prejudiced
listener”).
96. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1169
(1985). See generally Anthony P. Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV.
457 (1997).
97. Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 734.
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sounds like someone who will fit in and work out well within the specific
workplace.98
Consider the following: “Man, did you catch Duval on the back nine?
He’s three back on the 16th and goes birdie-eagle-birdie with a chip from
the bunker to win the British Open! Damn!”99
The statement not only requires familiarity with the intricacies and rules
of golf, golfers, and the significance of a particular tournament, but also
presumes a shared enthusiasm and a common affinity for a certain style of
discourse about sports. It is imbedded in culture.100
There can, of course, be cross-cultural communication. However, to the
extent that there are cultural differences among races,101 racial homogeneity
results in shared cultural references within racial groups.102 These shared
cultural references can in turn enhance communication and productivity.103
Employers can have greater confidence that their employees will share
certain values with regard to work habits or general attitudes towards
work,104 family, and government. They will be more likely to understand
each other’s jokes, and identify when a joke is being made. They are likely
to have more in common to discuss. Potential employees who are
culturally White and can speak “White” are more literate in a
communication standard that will allow the employer to reap network
benefits.105 Indeed, the argument for cultural homogeneity on utilitarian
grounds is often made expressly in the debate over “multiculturalism.”106
98. See Wiehl, supra note 90, at 186 (citing a Kentucky Supreme Court case where a
police officer’s deduction that a speaker’s voice indicated a specific race represented proper
testimony).
99. Thanks to E. Stewart Moritz for his help with the nuances of translation.
100. As part of their sophisticated body of work on the performative aspects of racial
identity in the workplace, Carbado and Gulati explore in particular the communication
problems that arise through workplace conversations. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 (2000).
101. See Gotanda, supra note 70, at 56 (asserting that the Supreme Court’s adoption of
color-blind constitutionalism ignores, and thereby devalues, unique cultural components
such as custom, belief, and intellectual and artistic traditions that distinguish races from one
another).
102. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 74 (discussing racial homogeneity as
an economic asset in the workplace); see also Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? “Gangsta”
Culture, Clarence Thomas, and Afrocentric Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 323-40
(2000) (describing the development of oppositional cultural norms in Black urban
communities).
103. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 74, at 1795-1802 (discussing incentives for
homogeneity).
104. Cf. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 133-34 (2000) (discussing racial
discrimination as a signal to other in-group members that one will be a loyal worker).
105. Carbado and Gulati observe that not only must racial outsiders negotiate their
identity in the workplace, but they must do so against a headwind consisting of stereotypes
about their outsider status. Thus, neither a Black employee combating stereotypes about
laziness nor a female employee battling stereotypes about her commitment to her career are
as free to choose to go home early or to decline work as is a White male employee. Carbado
& Gulati, supra note 100, at 110-12. Roithmayr argues similarly that the value placed on
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In this regard, note the prevalence of “private” social discrimination that
is often described as “benign” or “natural.”107 Commentators have noted
that Black and White Americans lead lives that are publicly integrated but
privately segregated; they may work at an integrated workplace, but often
go home to segregated neighborhoods, worship in segregated
congregations, and enjoy different forms of cultural entertainment.108 The
sources of this de facto segregation are, without doubt, complex and varied.
Here, I simply observe that the social ease that results when parties of the
same race are able to interact without having to “deal with” race produces a
system that functions most efficiently when all of the interacting parties are
of the same race.
Thus, language, culture, and personal comfort in the context of social
segregation produce network effects that push the market toward a
dominant standard. The efficient choice for employers is to hire employees
who already use the cultural operating system that is the norm, in the same
way that businesses are well advised to use the Windows operating system
rather than Apple’s Macintosh, regardless of the relative qualitative
merits109 of the two systems.
3.

Stereotypes
Beyond the effectiveness of direct and indirect communications among
individuals by means of their speech and behavior, race communicates
through stereotypes and images. Thus the young Black male in a White
neighborhood addressing a fearful White homemaker at her doorstep may
be incapable of communicating, through any effort of his own, an ordinary
sales pitch for vinyl siding. Her perception of poverty, lawlessness, and
White cultural practices in the legal education market gives White people the advantage of
lower costs of production, because they have easier access to the transmission of White
cultural norms. Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 754-55.
106. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 104 (1992);
Sylvia R. Lazos Varga, Deconstructing Homo[Geneous] Americanus: The White Ethnic
Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493, 1507 (1998)
(asserting that the utilitarian justification for cultural homogeneity is that the process of
assimilating immigrants from cultures similar to the Anglo-Saxon culture is less stressful on
the host group and results in less social conflict).
107. See, e.g., RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY 185 (2001) (observing that, in
explaining marital choices, Americans focus on similarity of background without
characterizing them as racial discriminations and fail to acknowledge how such a focus
creates a pattern of segregation that is taken for granted).
108. See, e.g., LEONARD STEINHORN & BARBARA DIGGS-BROWN, BY THE COLOR OF OUR
SKIN: THE ILLUSION OF INTEGRATION AND THE REALITY OF RACE (1999); ANDREW HACKER,
TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992).
109. One might debate whether characteristics that affect an individual’s ability to
communicate should not be included in the definition of “merit.” My intent is merely to
note that communication, including the messages that race convey in contemporary culture,
plays a large part in the ability of an individual to participate in a network economy that has
adopted a racial standard of Whiteness.
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propensity for physical violence prevents her from understanding him as
someone offering household services for sale.110
His task of overcoming the default standard of Whiteness is difficult in
light of the messages that his race communicates. He is identified as an
outsider; he has invaded private space; he matches the popular image of a
dangerous or violent person.111 He can, of course, attempt to overcome
these disabilities by affecting a pleasant and non-threatening disposition,
and by wearing neat, orthodox clothing.112 Generally, door-to-door sales
are a difficult business, and all who try it must develop strategies to make it
work. Nonetheless, some strategies are foreclosed according to the
communication that race sends. This salesperson is racially incompatible
with the network standard because of stereotypes.
Moreover, race communicates for the employer as well as for the
employee. Consider the role of the public spokesperson. An individual
represents a public official, government agency, or private firm to the
media, and indirectly to the entire public. To the extent that race
communicates a message to the American audience, a firm must be careful
with regard to the race of the individual who represents it.113 This is true of
all front-office, direct sales, or “window” positions with high visibility.114
The communicative aspect of race would have somewhat less impact in the
back room, the accounting office, or the research lab.
Some kinds of employment might combine a direct or indirect
communicative effect with a stereotype communicative effect. Consider,
for instance, the corporate lawyer. Lawyers must communicate effectively
with staff, with colleagues, with their counterparts at other firms with
whom they do business, with clients, and with the clerks, judges and juries
within the judicial system. They must employ the direct language
communication tools of prose, idiom, and metaphor. They must also
110. Her racial stereotypes may or may not be “irrational.” See generally ARMOUR,
supra note 47 (exploring whether such racial stereotypes are rational). My point here is not
that her racism prevents him from succeeding, but that the social context renders him unable
to communicate with her and excludes him from the network economy.
111. Id.
112. See generally PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK (1999) (describing the
discrimination lawsuit eventually brought by a Black corporate lawyer who always tried to
fit into his White surroundings).
113. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, A Limited Partnership, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2000, at A1
(describing a partnership of internet entrepreneurs in which the White partner became the
spokesperson).
114. See Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and
Employment Outcomes for Minority Workers, 113(3) Q. J. OF ECON. 835, 845-47 (1998)
(finding that that the racial composition of a business’ customers has a substantial effect on
the race of the person who gets hired, particularly in jobs that involve direct contact with
customers), available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item /default.asp?sid=80AE70CB8038-4502-A7D9-2068740DDF9A&ttype=6&tid=460. Note that rather than focusing on
suggesting invidious discrimination by buyers or patrons, my focus is on market power and
the impact of communication standards.
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master the cultural references, such as conferences, drinks, golf, and gender
dynamics. The message that their race sends is unavoidable.115
Stereotypes greatly complicate the already tenuous communication
situation that exists when an employee is trying to make a good impression
but must consider, in addition to all of the typical considerations, the
employer’s preconceptions about the employee.116
The stereotypes need not be dramatic ones, such as that a Black male is a
dangerous criminal.
Because network effects depend on effective
communication, all that is necessary for race to exhibit a network effect is
for a stereotype to impede communication. Identifying the race of another
person and then assuming, based on race, that the person will not be able to
chat about golf, have a different attitude towards the police, or disagree
about affirmative action and the general fairness of the marketplace, will
hamper communication, regardless of whether those assumptions are true.
These communication barriers can of course be overcome with conscious
effort. That extra effort, however, is a transaction cost that is not present
for employees who meet the racial standard.117
4.

In general
In general, my claim is that language, culture, and stereotypes
compromise interracial communications barriers that make non-Whites
incompatible with a network standard and therefore inefficient to hire.
While plausible, these observations are certainly speculative. I have not
attempted a mathematical or empirical proof. However, determining the
precise cause of interracial communication barriers is not essential to this
argument. One need only presume that White people, especially White
Americans, generally (but of course not always) communicate better with
each other than with non-Whites. I take it as common background
knowledge that this is so. Specifically, I assume that Whites generally
communicate better with other Whites as coworkers within firms, as
employees dealing with customers, and as employees dealing with the
employees of other firms.
To the extent that this is so, every employer, regardless of their race, has
economic cause to prefer to hire employees that will not experience this
communication barrier. Because most of those coworkers, customers, and
counterparts are White, the employer ought to prefer White employees, all
115. Carbado and Gulati have shown that in law firms, women and minority associates
must negotiate stereotypes regarding their competence and beliefs, which in turn interferes
with their ability to negotiate work assignments freely and hurts their prospects for
advancement. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 100, at 117 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. Cf. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 33-37 (1999).
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else being equal.118 And this is so regardless of whether the racial
domination of Whiteness among these populations is due to sheer numbers
or to historical advantage.
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF WHITENESS: LOCK-IN AND STICKY STANDARDS
Economist Brian Arthur has described how positive feedback magnifies
the effects of small economic shifts, and can drive markets towards any of
several competing standards.119 In economic terms, network markets
exhibit several possible equilibrium points. There is no guarantee that the
particular economic outcome selected will be the “best” one.120
Furthermore, once random historical events set the market on a particular
path, the choice may become locked-in, regardless of the advantages of the
alternatives.121 Thus if one product, firm or nation in a competitive
marketplace gets ahead by “chance,” it tends to stay ahead and even
increase its lead.122 This kind of “path dependence” results when small
“random” events accumulate and become magnified by positive feedbacks
so as to determine the eventual outcome.123
Such phenomena as the location of cities and the geographic
concentration of high technology industries have been characterized as the
result of feedback effects regarding access to markets, support services,
complementary goods, and the availability of individuals with the
necessary experience and know-how.124
Beyond the direct operation of network effects through shared
communication standards, Whiteness also persists as the dominant racial
standard because of positive feedback effects that continually reinforce its
dominance.125 Any dynamic that causes Whiteness to increase in value
when it becomes more widely adopted as a standard can create a positive
feedback loop that causes the standard to “lock in,” or become “sticky,”
and resistant to change.126 Simple economies of scale can contribute to this
effect.127
118. See Holzer & Ihlanfeldt, supra note 114, at 859 (finding that a racial preference for
employees that reflects the racial composition of a business’ customers reduces the overall
labor demand and wages for blacks).
119. See Arthur, supra note 25, at 116.
120. Id. at 116-17.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92, 92-99
(1990).
125. See Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative
Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (2002) (maintaining that law school admissions
standards operate as a positive feedback loop that reinforces and strengthens the advantage
of White applicants over applicants of other races).
126. Cf. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 425 (exploring the dynamics of positive
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A. Switching Costs
Switching costs are the costs of switching from one standard to
another.128 They play a role in determining whether a product or service
becomes an enduring standard. If the switching costs are high, it becomes
more difficult to induce consumers to change their behavior. For example,
entire cherished record collections became outmoded when the CD was
introduced, slowing its acceptance.129 The loss of the value of those LPs
represents a cost of switching to the proposed new standard. In this
example of course, the switching costs were overcome, despite the protests
of many avid audiophiles.
Note that even when switching costs are low, they can be critical. “A
million customers, each of whom has switching costs of $100, are just as
valuable, collectively, as a single customer whose switching costs are $100
million.”130
High individual or collective switching costs can represent a kind of
positive feedback as the installed base of users becomes more committed to
a standard.131 Their investment in the standard is what stands to be lost if
they switch. These costs can be in the form of physical goods, but can also
be the psychic costs of loosening strong psychological or emotional
commitments.132
With regard to a racial standard, one must consider the level of
commitment that the installed base of employers, employees, and
consumers of cultural images has to Whiteness. Although many Whites
claim not to be especially aware of race, they identify their own race with
confidence, and studies suggest that the value they place on this
identification is extraordinarily high.133
One example of a kind of direct switching cost might be in the area of
cultural images. Many of the icons of popular culture are White. Our
political leadership is predominantly White. Similarly, most of the eminent
figures in the dominant American historical narrative are White.

feedback loops creating market dominance).
127. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 494-95.
128. Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 775.
129. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 11.
130. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 108 (discussing “Mass Market Lock-in”).
131. See Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 775 (observing that male decision-makers tend to
select job applicants and employees to mentor based on preexisting contacts and
commonalities that correlate with gender).
132. Id.
133. See generally FLAGG, supra note 65, at 29 (asserting that Whites perceive and
interact with other Whites as individuals who have no significant racial characteristics,
leading to circumstances where Whites rely on White referents to formulate the norms and
expectations of White decision-makers to the detriment of minorities).
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One might explain that the majority of the White population simply feels
more affinity with White celebrities, politicians, and historical figures.
Setting aside the presumed naturalness of Whiteness implicit in that
explanation,134 note that White racial identity and racial identification are
essential to it. A White person must recognize and identify with both her
own Whiteness and the Whiteness of the cultural icon for this kind of racial
affinity to apply.
In order to establish non-White cultural images as preeminent in the
national imagination, Whites must give up this racial identity and affinity.
What would it take for Whites to feel an equal affinity toward Black
politicians, to identify with African-American historical figures as being
“our” heroes rather than “their” heroes, or for White children commonly
and comfortably to choose Black dolls?135 These might be examples of
psychic or emotional switching costs in the displacement of racial identities
and images.
Recently, of course, the all-White (and male) pantheon of heroes and
protagonists has in fact had to change in order to make room for others. So
the psychic switching costs are, to some extent, being paid. White
resentment and backlash demonstrate that, in some cases, the costs are not
being paid voluntarily and that they are in fact painful.136
Some of the changes have required new textbooks, new curricula, and in
the case of streets and buildings now named after Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., new signage. Resistance to renaming Chink’s Peak in Idaho in 2001
included the argument that renaming the mountain would not be
historically accurate.137 Some historical literary works have fallen out of
favor because they represent a more consciously racist viewpoint. These
are actual switching costs.
More importantly, one might note where changes have not occurred.
The emotional attachment of Cleveland baseball fans to their grinning, redskinned mascot, Chief Wahoo, is unwavering. The ubiquity of this image

134. See Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, “What Are You?” Hapa Girl and Multi-Cultural
Identity, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 463, 482 (2000) (observing that Whiteness is so ingrained as
the cultural norm that, once an individual is identified as White, race “fades almost
instantaneously from white consciousness into transparency”).
135. See WALDO E. MARTIN JR., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A BRIEF HISTORY
WITH DOCUMENTS (1998). Social psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark devised a doll
test as a way to gauge evidence of personality dysfunction among black children under Jim
Crow. When asked to choose between a white doll and a black doll, a preponderence of the
black children expressed a preference for the white doll.
136. See, e.g., 2002: A Critical Year for European-Americans, 53 DAVID DUKE REP.
(The David Duke Report, Mandeville, La.), 2002, at 1 (contending that American schools
ban all mention of Christians, while promoting “Black pagan celebrations such as Kwanza,”
and decrying the “primitive Black rhythms” that pervades White homes on MTV).
137. Ji Hyun Lim, All in a Name: Chinks Peak, ASIAN WEEK, Oct. 4, 2001, available at
http://www.asianweek.com/2001_09_28/news_chinkspeak.html.

LEE.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1284

1/17/2005 11:21:43 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1259

in northern Ohio on cars, on clothes, and in front yards represents both
emotional commitment and sunk costs. The story of “Little Black Sambo”
has been republished with a White illustrator who said, “We [White
people] look at [the story] with affection.”138 The Confederate flag
continues to be displayed on the grounds of the Georgia State capitol. One
account ascribes the recent electoral defeat of a popular Georgia governor
to his support for changing the state flag of Georgia to reduce the eminence
of the Confederate flag.139
Many of these costs represent sentimental attachments to historic
images. There is great nostalgia for the “good old days.” Note, however,
that there is little sentimental longing for outhouses, the lack of airconditioning, and explicit racial subjugation. The attachment is to images
that happen to be of industrious and meritorious White persons,140 and,
typically, the absence of racial others. One might see in this attachment a
form of property, that over time, familiarity and possession ripen into
ownership.141 One senses that objections to newly written histories—
histories that note the racist sensibilities of traditional White American
heroes and introduce the contributions and struggles of other populations—
are, in essence, property claims—“[t]hey are taking away our history.” To
the extent that that history is a narrative representation that muddies and
ignores the racist origins of the country, this complaint is accurate: the
multiculturalists have targeted that history for replacement.142
Uncertainty represents a type of switching cost when the reliability of the
old standard is a known quantity and the reliability of the proposed
replacement is less certain. One might reassure oneself by doing further
research, but this merely replaces uncertainty costs with search costs.
Here, an employer or employee who has never hired or worked with an
African-American or other non-White employee might hesitate simply
because of the uncertainty. The price of overcoming this hesitation is a
switching cost. One might reassure oneself, for instance, by asking pointed
138. Louise Kennedy, The Story of Little Black Sambo, BOSTON GLOBE, 2003, available
at http://www.handprintbooks.com/html_files/BOSTONGLOBEarticle.html.
139. Jeffrey Gettleman, An Old Battle Flag Helps Bring Down a Governor, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2002, at B2.
140. See Lazos Varga, supra note 106, at 1502 (asserting that the White ethnic
immigrant belief that hard work, assimilation, and virtue can overcome any adversity that
dominates the American cultural narrative is hegemonic because it mandates assimilation,
dismisses the power dynamics of racism, and ultimately pits the White assimilated ethnics
against the “raced” and the culturally different).
141. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709,
1734-36 (1993) (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects the protection of a
property right in Whiteness).
142. See generally RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR (1993) (asserting that past
scholarship has defined American history too narrowly because it often reflects the scholar’s
particular perspective of the world and what is needed to create a more complete, more
accurate picture of history).
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questions in an extended interview, or taking special care to contact all
listed references, but these extra steps also represent switching costs.
One might argue that antidiscrimination legislation, such as Title VII,
imposes potential costs on employers who do not hire non-White
applicants, and might thus balance these switching costs.143 Also plausible,
however, is the claim that the manner in which statutes like Title VII are
enforced might lead employers to avoid liability altogether by refusing to
hire non-White employees in ways that avoid successful discrimination
claims.144 Whether rational or irrational, a careful, motivated employer
likely will be able to avoid hiring non-Whites.
B. Skills
Switching costs can also be represented in the human capital costs of
retraining, for instance in converting to new accounting or word processing
programs. As software program improvements outpace the capacity of
human beings to learn new systems, most American employers in recent
years have become aware of how significant these retraining costs can be.
Every American is aware of the discomfort and awkwardness that can
take place in unfamiliar racial contexts. Communicating across racial
barriers requires new skills. The acquisition of new skills is a switching
cost that may not even be recognized as being necessary by many
employers. When courts impose diversity training as a remedy, it is often
considered an attempt to cure employers of unconscious bias.145 It might
better be considered one of the costs of adopting a new standard in the
workplace. A wise employer would anticipate such costs and implement
training of its own accord, rather than wait for it to be imposed.
One might, of course, simply encourage non-White employees to learn
and use Whiteness, as many have learned to do. Note that the costs of this
kind of accommodation are borne entirely by the non-White employees.146
This is the current approach taken by most employers, and the high burnout

143. See John J. Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1986)
(arguing that legislation that prohibits employer discrimination enhances rather than impairs
economic efficiency).
144. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 262-63 (asserting that the methods available for avoiding
the sting of Title VII are numerous, such as purposefully locating a worksite in an area with
few minorities).
145. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 685 (2003) (discussing cases where courtapproved consent decrees required diversity training, review of human resources practices,
and monitoring the effectiveness of the decree).
146. Cf. ARMOUR, supra note 47, at 13 (defining the “Black Tax” as “the price Black
people pay in their encounters with Whites (and some Blacks) because of Black
stereotypes”).
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and low retention rates of minorities in many industries are to be expected
under this analysis.147
“Diversity training” must educate employees about other racial cultures,
but the point should not be to teach the details of a foreign culture—as
though one might then “know” what every Black person thinks and feels.
Rather, the focus should turn inward, so that White employees can
understand the ways in which they participate in and support Whiteness.148
Just as those who learn to speak a language other than English come to
understand the rules of English better, those who study diversity should
come to understand their own racial standard better. One might then better
understand when one is excluding non-White peers from a network based
on Whiteness norms.
C. Coordination Costs
Note that even if there are few switching costs, there can still be a
coordination problem. There may not seem to be much of a network effect
at work if users of a standard are poorly committed to it and are willing to
switch to the next standard that comes along. If the market is one in which
it is valuable for there to be only one standard, there is nonetheless the
problem of not wanting to switch unless everyone else does as well, and the
uncertainty of not knowing if everyone else will.
The difficulty of coordinating such a switch makes switching less likely.
For example, a change from the QWERTY keyboard to the supposedly
superior Dvorak keyboard is difficult not only because of collective
switching costs, but also because of the difficulty in coordinating the
switch.149 One wants trained typists, so one must use the system that
typists are trained in. Typists want a marketable skill, so they should
choose to learn the skill that most employers and keyboard makers
support.150 Unless everyone changes, there is no reason for anyone to
change, despite the efficiency gains that a new keyboard design might
offer. Human capital that is compatible with specific a keyboard layout
gives rise to network effects.151

147. ARMOUR, supra note 47, at 17; see Carbado & Gulati, supra note 74, at 1762; David
B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law
Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 564 (describing the attrition of Black
lawyers at large corporate law firms).
148. See Robin D.G. Kelley, The Abolition of Whiteness and Black Freedom, RACE
TRAITOR (1997), at http://www.postfun.com/racetraitor/features/rkelley.html (on file with
the American University Law Review).
149. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 185-86.
150. See id. at 186.
151. But see LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 39, at 19-39 (arguing that the Dvorak
keyboard was not in fact a superior standard).
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Thus, an employer, who was convinced that the work required to
develop a more racially diverse workforce would be well worth the effort
because it would produce important business benefits, might be stymied by
the failure of other firms to reach the same conclusion.152 Firms that
continued to operate on a de facto Whiteness standard might not appreciate
the benefits of diversity, and the well-meaning employer could end up
simply cutting itself out of the network.
D. Complementary Products
Goods may increase in value even when not connected to a network of
like or compatible goods if economies of scale sustain production of
complementary goods and services. For example, exotic car repair services
are viable only where there are sufficient consumers to support them.153
The positive feedback is that it is worth more to own such a car in an area
where special services and parts are available. This occurs only when a
critical mass154 of others own the same kind of car. The fact that there are
so many software applications for Windows enhances its value, and all the
software is written for Windows because there are so many people who use
it.155 In contrast, other operating systems are handicapped by the relative
paucity of programs.
In the race context, to the extent that consumers of different races
consume different goods and services, there can be supply-side economies
of scale in the production of such complementary goods and services. Thus
one might observe that in many communities Whites have an easier time
than non-Whites in finding foods they like to eat, clothes in the sizes,
colors, and styles that they feel complement their looks or personal style, or
hair stylists competent to take care of their hair.156 If we view work
environments as goods offered to the population of workers, Whites will
have an easier time than non-Whites finding work environments in which
they feel comfortable.157
On the production side, people of any race can of course provide goods
and services that cater to White consumers and thus take advantage of this
larger market. However, to the extent that race signals expertise, there may
152. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Exxon Mobil Corp. at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S.
1043 (2003) (No. 02-241).
153. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 494.
154. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003). But see Chen, supra note 45, at
1844-45.
155. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 500-07.
156. See STEINHORN & DIGGS-BROWN, supra note 108, at 225 (citing as an example that
in Corning, New York, because there were only White barbershops, Corning Inc. recruited a
Black barber to help make its Black employees feel more at home).
157. See id. at 59-60 (explaining that since the majority of employees in America are
white, blacks have to navigate alone in the work world).
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be some limit on the ability of minority entrepreneurs to participate in this
market. A firm that serves the cultural needs of non-Whites can survive
when there is a critical mass to support it. Consider for instance, the
prevalence of Chinese grocery stores in Chinatown. But the availability of
Chinese groceries in many other communities is much more limited.
Many complementary products are not standard-specific, of course. For
example, much of the automotive infrastructure—garages, gas stations,
driving skills—easily supports both Ford and Toyota vehicles.158 Thus
while the automobile is a dominant standard for personal transportation, no
single automaker controls that standard. Similarly, many services are
equally compatible with white and non-white people alike. In contrast,
early Macintosh users made durable investments in assets that were
complementary only to a system controlled by Apple.159 Because of the
hampering effects of switching costs, the producer of a locked-in product
can extort users.160
Can White people charge a premium for their services? In a sense, they
do. No one else can provide the image, the communications capacity, the
signaling effects, the customer relations, the network advantages that White
people can. This is the flip side of economic analyses suggesting that
Blacks might offer themselves at lower wages in order to gain entry to the
market and demonstrate their value.161
Perhaps more importantly, commitment to Whiteness causes users to
incur opportunity costs when that commitment conflicts with other values.
Thus, an individual who might feel some motivation to advance racial
harmony, or who might otherwise derive some satisfaction or pleasure from
a racially diverse environment, might give these values up when faced with
the prospect of forced desegregation or falling home values.162
One interpretation of a more concrete complementary racial product
might be represented in the segregated nature of American residential
neighborhoods,163 schools,164 churches,165 and other social venues.166 Many
158. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 103.
159. Id. at 104.
160. See Paul Klemperer, Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An
Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International
Trade, 62 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 515, 515-16 (1995) (noting that future exploitation of
customers gives firms incentive to attract new customers).
161. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 263 (suggesting that less-educated blacks should take
jobs on an at-will basis and at lower wages to develop the skills they need to move ahead).
162. STEINHORN & DIGGS-BROWN, supra note 108, at 33.
163. STEVEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT DOOR:
SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 212-22 (2000) (stating
results of studies conducted to analyze the racial composition of American neighborhoods).
164. See STEINHORN & DIGGS-BROWN, supra note 108, at 42-44 (discussing the millions
of White and Black students attending racially segregated schools despite efforts around the
country to desegregate schools).
165. Id. at 62-64.
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Americans pay a lot to go to predominantly-White schools. They pay more
to live in neighborhoods where these schools are located and where there
are few, if any, Blacks. They will pay more to buy a house if they think
that they are buying it from a White person rather than a Black person.167
If this behavior were simply motivated by irrational racism,168 one might
characterize the behavior as a premium that White racists pay in support of
their evil intentions.169 However, none of these behaviors are in fact
penalized in the market.170 A decision to purchase a home in a more
integrated neighborhood for a lower price does not net the purchaser the
same quality of life, the same housing appreciation,171 or the same
educational opportunities.172 The cumulative wealth of Whites who value
Whiteness in the housing market drives the valuation of the market, as well
as the provision of such services as law enforcement, education, street
cleaning, favorable zoning designations, housing code enforcement, street
repair, and recreational opportunities.
The appreciation of real estate in White neighborhoods has generated
immense wealth for many people,173 all of it founded on racial segregation
and the network benefits of Whiteness. Giving up Whiteness as a standard
in residential housing threatens that continuing avenue of disparate wealth
creation. The loss of quality of life and future appreciation is therefore a
switching cost that many residents understandably hesitate to incur.
E. Complementary Standards
Sometimes two or more complementary standards can support the
dominance of the others.174 The dominance of Windows also supports the
dominance of the particular computer chips manufactured by Intel that
Windows uses. Or one might imagine that but for the dominance of

166. See id. at 64-68 (explaining that Blacks and Whites attend and enjoy different social
and cultural activities).
167. See id. at 29-30.
168. See generally id. at 37-39 (discussing the intentional steering away of blacks to
white neighborhoods by real estate agents); MEYER, supra note 163, at 30-47 (discussing
that intentional racisim played a large part in maintaining housing segregation).
169. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 8 (1957) (explaining that
those who discriminate must act as if they are willing to forego financial benefits in order to
avoid certain transactions).
170. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 147.
171. See id. at 147-51 (comparing the property value appreciation rate in White
communities as opposed to integrated communities).
172. See id. at 150 (stating that blacks are unable to obtain information about betterquality school systems when they are isolated to inner-city ghettoes).
173. See generally id. at 147.
174. See Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual
Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 273-74 (2002) (asserting
that gender status does not exist in “a pure form,” but rather that an individual’s dominant or
subordinate status is affected by the combination of racial and gender stereotypes).
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Windows, an internet-only browser and e-mail appliance might have
gained a greater audience, rather than the personal computer standard on
which Windows operates.
Because a strong national antiracism norm has been adopted, any explicit
reference to Whiteness is now frowned upon. For Whiteness to survive as a
standard, it must go undercover. Approval and disapproval of individuals
based on racial standards are now expressed in language that does not refer
to race directly.
Thus, one might comment on an applicant’s
professionalism, attitude, values, “classic American” looks,175 or
communication skills rather than mentioning the applicant is White. Public
discourse regarding such issues as crime, welfare, poverty, immigration,
drug use, or “urban” issues also carries strong racial connotations without
explicitly mentioning race.
These complementary standards might serve simply to disguise hidden
or unconscious racism. But even assuming they do not, to the extent that
they transmit qualifications that favor White people, they serve to buttress
Whiteness as a dominant standard. Thus, for example, when a group is
described as “patriotic,” it invokes both Whiteness (because the historical
patriot is White) and an impression of national history and identity that is
founded on Whiteness.176
Consider two broader examples: (1) the idea of Western progress and
civilization originating in Europe; and (2) the parallel theories of
meritocracy, evolution, and liberal economics. Given the close correlation
of Whiteness to European ancestry, the dominant historical narrative of the
triumph (as opposed to, say, the historical accident,177 the travesty, or the
merciless conquest178) of Western civilization serves as a powerful
foundation to justify the historic position of Whites.179 Combine that
narrative with the theme that it is only fair (merit), natural (evolution), and
175. See Steven Greenhouse, Abercrombie & Fitch Bias Case Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2004, at A16 (noting that the settlement of the case included a requirement to add
diversity to marketing materials); Steven Greenhouse, Clothing Chain Accused of
Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at A21 (reporting on the suit filed against
Abercrombie & Fitch for discriminating against non-Whites in seeking to project a “classic
American” look).
176. See generally Lazos Varga, supra note 106, at 1584-95 (discussing the negative
stereotypes expressed toward foreigners who are viewed as less patriotic).
177. See generally JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN
SOCIETIES (1997) (explaining that the success of Eurasians was a historical accident of
geography propelled in part by the availability of iron ore deposits and the suitability of
European terrain for large, domesticated animals).
178. See Johnson v. M’Intosh 21 U.S. 543, 544 (1823) (discussing the impact of the rule
of conquest on the status of Indian land title); see also DIAMOND, supra note 177, at 197
(stating that Native Americans were victims of murderous Spanish conquistadores).
179. See Lazos Varga, supra note 106, at 1522-23 (explaining the White ethnic
immigrant myth, which connects White ethnics to a heroic story of “the immigrant, who
arrived poor and was discriminated against, but worked hard and eventually made it”).
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efficient (economics) for the dominant culture to be left to prevail without
interference, and one is left with a powerful weave of ideology and theory
that, without explicitly mentioning race, justifies the modern dominance of
Whiteness. Just as the success of Intel chips supports the dominance of
Windows, adherence to ideals of Western civilization, social evolution, and
the free market supports Whiteness.
F. Reputation and Status
Note that at a seasonal level, many phenomena exhibit increasing
returns.180 Examples include: seeing “hit” movies, reading “hot” books, or
listening to the most popular music so that your appreciation can be shared
with others who have done the same. Any item or behavior that comes to
signify status can have a similar, conformity-inducing effect.181 The
“Must-see TV” slogan is an attempt to induce this effect by naming it.
To the extent that the emotional commitment to a product is internalized,
as with brand loyalty, displacing a dominant standard can be very difficult.
Brands, of course, also represent a reputational effect. One hopes to be
able to rely on the quality and consistency of a familiar brand.182 The
tremendous information costs of consumers choosing from among a vast
array of goods is thus dramatically reduced for those who find a brand they
can trust. The firms that can produce the branded products that earn this
trust can thus gain superior returns.183 Brand management, the process of
carefully guiding the image of an identifiable mark, is consequently an
essential issue.
One might further develop the ways in which brand management
resembles the management of racial lines. My point here is that Whiteness
might be thought of as a strong brand because it is familiar, has a long
history of reliability, has connotations of patriotism and wholesome values,
and is easily distinguished from other products through the familiar
physical characteristics of its packaging. TV shows, books, movies, and
advertising for residential developments, vacation resorts, cars, or clothes
that feature entirely White models or casts are essentially extending and
exploiting the racial brand of Whiteness. The producers of these works
need not be explicitly or consciously racist: they are simply seeking a
particular aesthetic appeal that Whiteness captures.184
180. See, e.g., MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN
MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 3-5 (2000) (using the example of Hush Puppies sales that
unexpectedly rose as a result of a new style that emerged in Manhattan).
181. Id. at 12-13.
182. See, e.g., DAVID ARNOLD, THE HANDBOOK OF BRAND MANAGEMENT 8-9 (1992)
(explaining that consumers save time and energy when depending on a certain brand).
183. Id. at 3.
184. See generally E. Christi Cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491, 492
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Cheryl Harris notes that once it was invented, “Whiteness was a form of
status property,” recognized as a reputational interest in being regarded as
White.185 Note that it was libelous per se to call a White person Black, as
an allegation likely to cause injury. The reverse was not true—“the law
expressed and reinforced the social hierarchy as it existed.”186
Some goods operate most importantly as signals of status, “hipness,” or
patriotism. Modern advertising that does not picture or even describe the
product being advertised is all about creating an impression of the kind of
person who owns the product. One purchases a product to express and
demonstrate one’s identity as a rebel, a roamer, or a Romeo. Note that this
effect requires that both the seller and the intended audience understand
what the signal means.
Racial stereotypes operate this way as well. Because the physical
characteristics that have come to denote race are so important to visual
identification in the United States, race is a necessary part of personal
image. Shared impressions of racial images are reinforced when one’s
peers agree that a particular section of town seems dangerous, even when
there have been no reports of crimes there. A home for sale that has
pictures of its African-American owners on display receives offers far
lower than if the owners are presumed to be White. The house is, in effect,
carrying the wrong brand.
One might try to counter the perceived impression of their race. An
Asian-American might take pains not to look foreign or nerdy. Blacks
might be careful never to appear poor or menacing. In discussions that deal
with race, White students tend to place special emphasis on their lack of
any kind of economic advantage or privilege. This counters the racial
stereotype applicable to White people: that they are the beneficiaries of
racism. An alternative strategy might be to give up fighting the image and
instead exploit it. A Black male, tired of fearful stares, might come to act
boisterously or menacingly and at least gain the small satisfaction of
inducing fear on his own terms.
Wherever there is White privilege, such as when traveling on the
highway, in shopping malls, in interactions with law enforcement, in school
placement, in neighborhood facilities, or in everyday interactions with
coworkers, strangers, and friends on the street, in the cafeteria, or in the
classroom, giving up that privilege will be a cost of switching from
Whiteness to a different standard.

(2002) (“Values from race markets brand actors in the labor market.”).
185. Harris, supra note 141, at 1734-36.
186. Id. at 1736; see also DENNIS CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES: NORMS
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 20-24 (2000) (discussing status politics).
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G. The Trump Card: Direct Network Benefits to the Employer
In theory, Whiteness could have become a dominant network standard
regardless of the racial identity of the employers in a market, just as
English has become a standard in many countries where English is not the
native language. The benefits accrue to employers as a result of the
network effects among employees. If a mythical African-American-owned
super-firm bought all of the top 500 corporations, the firm would still
benefit from adhering to the standard of Whiteness for employees in the
United States.
Because of the historical status and advantage of Whites, however, an
added feedback effect exists that does not exist in the orthodox examples of
network markets: the individuals in each firm making and approving the
hiring decisions are usually White.187 In addition to the firm’s interest in
having employees that meet the Whiteness standard, each individual White
actor has a personal economic self-interest in seeing the dominance of
Whiteness in society and culture maintained.
Thus any rationalization required for a person in a supervisory position
to prefer Whiteness while maintaining an antidiscriminatory stance benefits
not only the firm but the individual himself. The same applies to the
producers and developers of mass media who are usually White and whose
emphasis is on White protagonists. The triumph of Western civilization
caters not only to the tastes of White consumers but justifies their status as
well. It is as though consumers of computer operating systems were
themselves personal computers running Windows. Not only do they
benefit from the network advantages of adopting the dominant standard
when they choose Windows, but they advance their own interests by
choosing a standard in which they themselves are valued.
III. ESTABLISHING STANDARDS: PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY TO THE DOMINATION OF WHITENESS
Network dominance is the product of positive feedback. One might
argue that a product or standard has to be well-situated to achieve the
communication norms and market position required to exploit that positive
feedback. In other words, one might expand the definition of merit to
argue that in fact Windows is a better product than Macintosh because Bill
Gates had the foresight to distribute his operating system software cheaply
and freely in order to take advantage of network effects. Thus, the
187. See Mary Margaret Penrose, Beyond Observable Prejudice—Moving From
Recognition of Differences to Feasible Solutions: A Critique of Ian Ayres’ Pervasive
Prejudice?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 361, 363 (2002) (asserting that the disproportionately large
number of white males holding positions of power affecting minorities contributes to
structural prejudice in the United States).
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dominance of the network standard might be conceived of as having been
earned. Here I describe how market dominance in network markets can
depend on small, random, historical events rather than any meritorious
design or foresight. I briefly allude to the recently burgeoning scholarship
on the invention of Whiteness to argue that the market dominance of
Whiteness was established through brute force and legal manipulation
rather than through any admirable notion of merit.
A. Contingency on Historical Events
In network markets, the positive relationship between demand and value
creates a virtuous cycle.188 Because this positive feedback accelerates the
market towards the choice of a standard, several economic equilibriums are
possible.189 That is, regardless of their features or merits, any one of
several possible alternative standards could emerge as the dominant
standard, but only one will. The achievement of actual market dominance
can be based on small historical events.
Because of their unique preferences or their high switching costs, some
consumers prefer to continue to use non-standard products.190 They may,
however, experience a vicious cycle: the product loses value as it is
abandoned by users, eventually stranding those diehards who hang on the
longest. The initial defectors pay a high cost in changing standards, but if
the defector is at the leading edge of a virtuous cycle, the defection can
accelerate into a new norm. Arguably this has happened with regard to
overt racism. Whereas the first Whites to embrace nondiscrimination were
scorned and met with strong formal and informal social sanctions,191 now it
is David Duke who is the outcast.192 The main point is that if you are in the
middle of the curve, a very small historical push can determine whether
your cycle is vicious or virtuous.
B. The Social and Legal Construction of Whiteness
In light of the above, if one is to characterize Whiteness as a standard in
a network market, one might expect to find arbitrary historic events
188. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 175-79.
189. See id. at 181 (explaining the demand side economies).
190. Id.
191. Cf. Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 352 (1997) (stating that “[a] norm exists as long as the sanctions
imposed on violators create an expected cost for noncompliance that exceeds the expected
cost of compliance”); POSNER, supra note 104, at 138-39 (explaining how discriminating
against deviants among the in-group can serve as a signal to enforce norms).
192. David Duke is a former Grand Wizard of the Knights of the Klu Klux Klan and
actively promotes the cause of “White Rights.” See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, DAVID
DUKE:
IN HIS OWN WORDS, (May 2000), available at http://www.adl.org
/special_reports/duke_own_words/duke_intro.asp.
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establishing this standard. Here, the literature on the origins of Whiteness
is growing rapidly.193
Many aspects of the history of the establishment of White racial
domination are widely received. Hundreds of years of Black slavery
followed by another 100 years of explicit, legal, public and private race
segregation and discrimination is certainly enough of an historical push to
establish a dominant standard. My point here is that the domination of
Whiteness is contingent on that specific history.194 Racial standards exhibit
path dependence. That is, Whiteness continues to be the dominant racial
standard simply because it was established as such in the past, rather than
because of any intrinsic merit.
It is no longer novel to speak of the social construction of race, except
perhaps in law and economics.195 Economic analysts sometimes describe
people as being “Black” or “White” in the same way that a chair or a cat is
black or white, and the economic puzzle of racism is why anyone would
presume that a Black person is less attractive, capable, or qualified than a
White person.196
It is tempting, given the color-consciousness in which most Americans
are socialized, to think that Blackness and Whiteness are simply so obvious
a physical distinction as to be a “natural” basis for racial difference. There
are many strongly entrenched group conflicts around the world, however,
that in form mimic what we call racial divisions, but which take place
between groups that might appear to us to be “naturally” similar. Consider
conflicts between equally Semitic Jews and Arabs in the Middle East,
between equally Slavic Serbians and Croatians in the former Yugoslavia, or
among castes in India. The question thus reappears: how did racial
Whiteness/Blackness, assigned according to (roughly) European and
African ancestry, become the locus for status division in America?
To say that race is socially constructed, is to observe that the category is
primarily a human invention,197 a social classification, albeit a social

193. See, e.g., RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A
DIFFERENT COLOR (1998); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991).
194. Cf. DIAMOND, supra note 177, at 22-23 (arguing that simple geographic features
conducive to the development of biological immunities, steel, and firearms explain the rise
of Europe as the dominant world power).
195. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 74, at 1763 (explaining that most economic studies of
race treat it as though it were simply a physical biological characteristic).
196. See STEINHORN & DIGGS-BROWN, supra note 108, at 181-83 (describing a racist’s
perception of blacks).
197. See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 54-55 (1994) (emphasizing that race is a
social classification that in turn imposes certain social order and has cultural consequences).
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classification based on physical characteristics.198 In hindsight, modern
racial divisions seem so vast that it is hard to imagine that small, random
events might have altered the development of the strong racial identity that
Americans experience. Rather, it seems as though large, inexorable
historic tides created race in America.199 The idea of the ordinary
functioning of market forces is so strong that there is a danger of assuming
that whatever the current state of events, they are the result of the invisible
hand and the market. Therefore, many assume that Windows is in fact the
best operating system around, and that Microsoft must be an efficient and
smart company—look how much money they make! Yet most of those
who reach this conclusion have never tried a computer operating on
Macintosh or Linux. It is important to separate the current state of affairs
from the implicit conclusion that they are the result of ordinary market
forces. Could things have been different here?
One might attempt to imagine a world in which different historical
circumstances prevailed and a different racial standard was established.200
More to the point, one might imagine a world in which a standard
developed along lines that we would not today consider racial. Scholars
tracing the historical development of the construction of Whiteness note
that among early colonists in America, racial divisions were neither
consistently respected nor strictly enforced.201 White indentured servants
existed alongside free Blacks, and interracial social relations were observed
to be widespread.202
Suppose that at this moment in American history, the ideal of height had
been valued more than it already was. Blacks might have been separated
by cultural or educational barriers but greatly respected for their height. A
general division of Talls and Shorts might have developed. These are, of
course, hereditary characteristics, and one might expect that Talls would
prefer to marry each other, and produce Tall families, regardless of skin
color. Talls might be known for their bravery and industriousness;
everyone knows, on the other hand, that Shorts are greedy and impatient,
198. LOPEZ, supra note 19, at 14.
199. See JACOBSON, supra note 193, at 2.
200. Numerous authors have depicted a future universe in which the Earth is dominated
by China and Chinese culture. See generally JOHN HERSEY, WHITE LOTUS (1965);
MAUREEN F. MCHUGH, CHINA MOUNTAIN ZHANG (1992); DAVID WINGROVE, THE CHUNG
KUO SERIES (1990); KIM STANLEY ROBINSON, THE YEARS OF RICE AND SALT (2002).
201. See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North
America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1742-73 (1996) (describing how Massachusetts’ Body
of Liberties Code both prohibited and legitimized slavery).
202. See Jason A. Gillmer, Suing For Freedom: Interracial Sex, Slave Law, and Racial
Identity in the Post Revolutionary and Antebellum South, 82 N.C. L. REV. 535, 550 (2004)
(citing Ira Berlin, who wrote that for the “first fifty years of English and African settlement
in the Chesapeake, black and white workers lived and worked together in ways that blurred
racial lines”).

LEE.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

1/17/2005 11:21:43 AM

NETWORK EFFECTS OF WHITENESS

1297

notable exceptions going only to prove the general point. The occasional
Tall-looking offspring of a Short couple might produce a warning among
Talls: “she looks Tall, but she’s really Short.”203 Or one might speculate
about scandalous behavior by an indiscrete Tall among the Short couple’s
ancestors.204 Tall and Short children would come to understand their height
identity from birth and would both internalize and enforce the social
meanings that came along with that identity. This would not, of course, be
a non-racial standard. Rather, it is an alternate history of race, where race
revolves around height rather than skin color.
In reality, the distinction between African and White indentured labor
grew even as the demand for slave labor increased, resulting in a reliance
on what became African slave labor.205 The formation of White identity
was intimately tied to the evolution and expansion of chattel slavery.206
“The dominant paradigm of social relations, however, was that, although
not all Africans were slaves, virtually all slaves were not white.”207
Economic interests dependent on Black slavery had powerful interests in
stabilizing that system.208 White indentured servitude diluted the clarity of
a racial polarity aligned along labor status divisions.209
If there were to be both free individuals and bound labor, and bound
labor was to be justified in a country founded in part on post-enlightenment
egalitarian principles, one might imagine a search for a “natural” division
among workers.
A theory of blended economic and biological
specialization would be that one or more races might be fit especially for
bound labor and another race or races might be suited for entrepreneurship
and management. Thus one might imagine the circumstances of a free
Black with White indentured servants in the South during the evolution of
African chattel slavery. While initially being merely a statistical anomaly,
the free Black might soon find his very existence challenged the developing
identification of Blackness with subjugation and Whiteness with dominant
status. Social ostracism would cause difficulty finding business partners

203. See GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A
WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995) (telling the story of a boy with white
skin who was raised by Black relatives, and because of this, experienced racism and
discrimination).
204. Cf. WILLIAM PETERS, A CLASS DIVIDED: THEN AND NOW (1987) (documenting a
1970 third grade class that underwent a discrimination experiment where the children roleplayed after being broken down into blue-eyed people and brown-eyed people).
205. See Harris, supra note 141, at 1716-17 (highlighting the development of race-based
slavery).
206. Id.; see also Wiecek, supra note 201, at 1756-57.
207. Harris, supra note 141, at 1717.
208. ROEDIGER, supra note 193, at 34.
209. Wiecek, supra note 201, at 1713.
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with which to transact.210 In time, the enforcement of powerful social
norms moves beyond economic notions of boycott and towards violence.211
Prior to this evolution, however, race was understood more narrowly to
define groups that we would today characterize as “ethnicities.” In order to
comprehend the challenge of understanding why Whiteness emerged as the
dominant racial standard, imagine that the dominant division instead turned
out to be Anglo-Saxon v. non Anglo-Saxon races212 or Aryan v. non-Aryan
races. In other words, one might imagine that the Irish,213 Italian, and
Greek “races” came to be considered “Black.” It is no historical accident
that Whites are the vast majority of workers. Jews, Catholics, Southern
Europeans of all nationalities, Irish, Slavs, and other groups now
considered White214 have all been racially despised and risked outsider
status in American history.215 Had they remained outsiders, there might
have been a greater danger that the dominant standard would have failed.
Imagine a world in which all of these workers came to be characterized as
“Black.” Instead, just as Microsoft often purchases and absorbs software
companies that might have become a threat, Whiteness expanded to include
these groups. That they all came to be identified—and to identify
themselves—as White demonstrates the success of Whiteness in becoming
the dominant network standard. There were obvious material benefits to
the decision of White workers to define themselves according to their
Whiteness.216 Whiteness helped avoid class conflict because White
workers could accept their lower class status by forming positive White
identities in opposition to slavery and Blackness.217 As a result,

210. See discussion infra Part III.C regarding the enforcement of social norms through
informal, third-party mechanisms.
211. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (describing
how the current American legal system is a social organization of legal violence).
212. See JACOBSON, supra note 193, at 43-44 (noting the emphasis on distinctions
between Anglo-Saxon and other European races until the issue of slavery arose).
213. See, e.g., THEODORE ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE (1994) (tracing the
transformation of the Irish from downtrodden “Celts” to privileged “Whites”); NOEL
IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 2-3 (1995) (describing the stigmatization and
assimilation of Irish immigrants from high-risk, low-wage employment to competitive
employment and social status).
214. See Harris, supra note 141, at 1742-43 (explaining that the “amalgamation of
various European strains into an American identity was facilitated by an oppositional
definition of Black as ‘other’”).
215. See Juan Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The ‘Normal Science’
of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1230 (1997) (citing Toni Morrison’s
example of how acts of racial contempt against Blacks transform immigrants into “entitled
white[s]”).
216. Id.
217. IGNATIEV, supra note 213, at 124-41 (describing how Irish immigrants claimed
Whiteness by attacking blacks).
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“Whiteness produced—and was reproduced by—the social advantage that
accompanied it.”218
To the extent that cultural norms constitute Whiteness, note Jack
Balkin’s argument that cultural practices evolve through a process that is
entirely dependent on historical antecedents.219 Building on the work of
Richard Dawkins, Balkin emphasizes the self-regenerating aspects of
cultural practices and norms and deemphasizes the individuals in whose
lives those practices are performed.220 Thus, cultural standards are path
dependent and sticky in the same way that network standards are.
C. The Old Boys’ Network
My claim that Whiteness operates as a network racial standard is not
merely that White people have an exclusive network, although the two are
related. While the “old boys’” network does operate to preserve privileges,
it is usually imagined differently than a network standard in the sense that I
mean. The idea of the old boys’ club is that people with certain biological
and genetic characteristics—White men—intentionally and perhaps
covertly reserve economic benefits for other members of the club,
particularly those who share certain social or class characteristics such as
school ties, inherited wealth, or shared acquaintances.221 Often these ties
harken back to local or family history, to periods when Whites “happen” to
have been formally dominant, both socially and economically.
There is a sense in this depiction that individuals use the old boys’
network intentionally to subvert merit-based selection to benefit the “right”
kind of people.222 Importantly, then, those who are not intentionally racist
or who do not share the right kind of exclusive class and social ties can
claim not to be practitioners or beneficiaries of the old boys’ privilege.
However, the operation of network standards requires no intentional,
irrational discrimination, and no special, direct connections. For example,
the consumer has only rational benefits in mind when choosing the
telephone, the English-speaking employee, or Windows. No malice

218. Harris, supra note 141, at 1742.
219. See JACK BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 17 (1998)
(explaining that “[t]o exist in history means to be the bearer of a particular variety of
cultural software that has been produced through a process of cultural evolution”). Balkin
gives an example of how sixteenth and twentieth century people have different kinds of
existence because of their different “cultural software.” Id.
220. Id. at 43-72.
221. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for
Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 429, 435-36 (1986) (discussing the old boys’ network
in the context of legal academia).
222. See, e.g., id. at 435 (pointing out that in the realm of appointing faculty in academia,
“[t]he fact that the ‘Old Boy Network’ is alive, well, and more often than not the source of
information most critical to the appointments process is news to none of us”).
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towards the short-wave radio, the applicant who speaks only Polish, or
Apple’s Macintosh is required.
The network effects of Whiteness operate this way—without necessary
discriminatory intent, and with regard to real economic benefits. The
standard of Whiteness is a socially and legally-constructed standard, rather
than merely an irrelevant biological characteristic.223
I do not mean to understate the pervasive impact that an old boys’
network can have in preserving privilege.
Especially in small
communities, a particular established social network of acquaintances —
the “pillars” of the community—could so dominate a market that outsiders
and newcomers are absolutely, or at least significantly, excluded from
important economic benefits.224 These exclusive networks are often White
because they are based on historical advantage. Moreover, the exclusion
need not be intentionally racist to have a continuing racial impact. When
an important local contractor hires the friend of a son, or the son of a
friend, for a summer job, he is simply doing favors, perhaps for someone
who looks like him, or who reminds him of himself when he was young.225
However, because social segregation remains the norm, such casual and
innocent favors have an unequal racial impact.226
Nonetheless, these kinds of social networks do not produce the kind of
economic network effects that are the subject of this Essay. While the
dominance of a social clique is path-dependent and race-correlated, it does
not produce positive returns such that the benefit to each member becomes
greater the larger the network extends.

223. Whiteness is, of course, much more than skin color or biology. Neither the Japanese
Ozawa, who tried to prove how pale his skin was (Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178
(1927)), nor the Indian Thind, scientifically classified as Caucasian (United States v. Thind,
261 U.S. 204 (1923)), were (or are) deemed White. See LOPEZ, supra note 19, at 79-92.
The one-drop rule that rendered those with the tiniest bit of African descent to be Black, and
therefore subject to slavery, is not a biological rule but a social one. See Kenneth Payson,
Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed Race
People, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1243-49 (1996). The histories of how Jews and Irish became
White reveals a social and political, rather than biological, transformation. Consider the
ambiguous racial regard that Americans currently have for Arabs, Iraqis, Turks,
Argentineans, and other groups. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130,
1142 n.35 (2000) (citing Doug Daniels, The White Race is Shrinking: Perceptions of Race
in Canada and Some Speculations on the Political Economy of Race Classification, 4
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 353, 354 (1981) (showing results of an informal student survey on
the race of certain nationalities)).
224. See CHONG, supra note 186, at 20 (discussing how status issues show the public
commitment of society and government to certain groups, cultures, and lifestyles).
225. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 147, at 569 (discussing the “bias that potential
mentors have for protégés who remind them of themselves”).
226. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 221, at 435 (giving the example that minority
students derive fewer benefits from the “old boys’ network” because they are less likely to
have developed close relationships with the White professors).
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has laid out a vision of how Whiteness maintains itself as the
dominant racial standard in America through network economics. The
vision offers rich possibilities for further development. I note in particular
three suggestions of topics for further development, and one broader
agenda:
Topic 1: Racial stances and attitudes are analogous to the strategic
business behavior of those defending or coping with a dominant standard.
Much of the popular literature on network economics has come from the
field of business management.227 Having identified the power of networks,
these analysts offer advice with regard to how a firm might capture these
benefits by controlling the dominant standard.228 Some of the questions
that arise relate to the best strategies for sharing a standard to ensure that it
dominates; how to prevent other standards from being established; or what
one’s alternatives are when losing a struggle over standards. It appears as
though the advice given correlates well with racial strategies adopted by
both Whites and non-Whites. In order to maintain the dominance of
Whiteness, for instance, Whites would be well-advised to ignore the
existence of non-Whites, to assume that everyone adheres to the default
standard of Whiteness unless an explicit exception is made,229 and to ignore
claims of unfair treatment as unmeritorious or just sour grapes. NonWhites facing a market that adheres to a Whiteness standard would be
well-advised to develop an effective interface with that standard,230 and to
absorb the costs of making that translation work, or to carve out small
niche markets within which alternative racial standards might dominate.231
White Network Economics challenges the foundational economic notion
of the rational individual. For Whiteness to be maintained as a network
standard, Whites—if they are to be taken at their word that they are not
conscious racists—are not rational because they are acting in ways that are
directly contrary to their expressed and sincere beliefs in color-blindness.
Moreover, they are not even entirely individuals, as they are acting in
concert to maintain racial domination. These two charges—that Whiteness
operates as a racial standard despite conscious commitments to color-

227. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 173-225.
228. Given the competitive pressure to control standards in network markets, legal
analysts focus on whether and how competitive behavior in such markets should be
regulated, or how standard-setting might best be accomplished. See, e.g., Lemley, supra
note 46, 1059-65.
229. FLAGG, supra note 65, at 1-18, 30-38.
230. Cf. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 285-87 (noting how firms losing a
standards battle might try to adapt their product to connect to the larger network).
231. Cf. id. at 248 (pointing out that Apple has survived in the wake of Microsoft’s
success because of its niche strategy).
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blindness, and that Whiteness operates as a racial standard even in the
absence of external direction—require further exploration.
Topic 2: Behavioral psychology and cognitive dissonance can explain
how White Network Economics can work in the age of color-blindness.
The emerging insights of behavioral law and economics232 offer the
beginnings of an explanation of how it is that individuals apply limited
available information, overvalue initial allocations, and construct selfserving rationalizations to justify their conclusions and actions. While the
resulting racial disparities are hard to ignore, Whites can thus understand
them as not resulting from racism.233 In short, it is in the interest of Whites
both to maintain the dominance of Whiteness and not to understand
themselves as supporting White domination. Human beings appear to be
capable of managing this trick.
Topic 3: Social norms can result in the organization of Whiteness
without hierarchy. There is, of course, no Bill Gates of Whiteness
directing the actions of all White people to maintain a dominant market
position. However, recent work in law and social norms234 applies
economic analysis and game theory to produce a theory of how
sophisticated social cooperation and organization can develop even in the
absence of a directing intelligent actor.235 Thus, Richard McAdams in
particular lays out a theory of esteem payments which would support the
development of intragroup loyalty and intergroup competition along racial
lines.236 Eric Posner suggests that racial discrimination might arise out of a
series of signaling conventions.237 Glenn Loury has written about the
socio-mechanisms that produce racial stigma of African-Americans.238
Together, these theories suggest that Whiteness is perfectly capable of
maintaining itself without there being any leader.239
232. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) (explaining that the purpose of this approach is to look at the
affect on the law of actual human behavior, which includes “bounded rationality, bounded
willpower and bounded self-interest”).
233. See ARMOUR, supra note 47, at 12-13; Lawrence, supra note 47, at 374-76 (citing
polls that found that most Whites do not blame racism and discrimination as the major
causes of inequality between Blacks and Whites).
234. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); POSNER, supra note 104.
235. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); DENNIS
CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991).
236. See McAdams, supra note 191, at 355, 356-75 (arguing that “norms arise because
people seek the esteem of others”).
237. See POSNER, supra note 104, at 133-40 (suggesting that “discrimination against
people with salient and immutable characteristics that systematically differ from those of
desired cooperative partners serves as a signal to the latter that one has a low discount
rate”).
238. See LOURY, supra note 88, at 61-65 (giving an example of racial profiling and
explaining that this act perpetuates false beliefs and prohibits learning).
239. See BALKIN, supra note 219, at x (pointing out that “[a]dvocates of social
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Topic 4: A broader agenda: Whiteness and other natural complex
systems. Current racial orthodoxy puts forth the autonomous individual as
the principal unit of analysis and characterizes race as an irrelevant
biological characteristic. Absent racist intent on the part of individuals,
disparate racial effects magically disappear from view.
Network
economics alters this perspective by pointing out the effect that systems can
have on individual incentives and actions.240 But network economics is not
the only new field of study in which the phenomenon is playing out.
Biologists and computer scientists are studying swarm intelligence to see
how simple insects can produce sophisticated group behavior.241 Richard
Dawkins posits that genetic characteristics might be thought to propagate
themselves, regardless of the intent or motive of the organisms that carry
the characteristics.242 Carrying over this insight into cultural evolution, one
sees a system in which individuals are not cultural actors but vessels for
cultural continuity. Leaf formation, city formation,243 cellular automata,244
and certain random numbers are seen to produce similar patterns, not
through divine guidance or intelligent supervision, but because of the
universal nature of pattern formation. In the right circumstances, a market
can reach a “tipping point,” and the actions of thousands of independent
market actors can produce coordination and unison so perfect as to
resemble a conspiracy245 or a choir. The study of the complexity and
coordination that simple actors can produce by following simple
instructions is everywhere it seems. The time has come to apply these
insights to the problem of race. The general point is the same: individuals
acting without malice can nonetheless produce a complex and oppressive
racial scheme in the same way that ants can build cities,246 cells can
construction have been looking in the wrong place” and need to look “deeper inside”
individuals).
240. Cf. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 10 (“When you are selling one
component of a system, you can’t compete if you’re not compatible with the rest of the
system.”).
241. See, e.g., STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS,
CITIES, AND SOFTWARE 18 (2001); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution:
The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66
TENN. L. REV. 137 (discussing evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and his Biomorph
Land computer program).
242. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1990); see also Geu, supra
note 241; BALKIN, supra note 219, at 43 (describing how Dawkins’ “memes” “spread from
person to person by observation and social learning . . . [through which] people internalize
and assimilate skills, beliefs, attitudes and values”).
243. JOHNSON, supra note 241, at 33.
244. STEVEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE 1-16(2002).
245. See Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons & White Devils: Antiblack Conspiracy
Theorizing & the Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1995) (discussing
the antiblack conspiracy theory “dealing with the wholesale destruction of urban black
communities by means of drugs and guns”).
246. See JOHNSON, supra note 241, at 29-33 (pointing out that ants conjure up colonies
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produce trees, and people can produce trends, fashions,247 and social
movements.248
To make progress on race, a new vocabulary must be developed that is
both critical of institutions and structures that maintain the racial
domination of Whiteness, yet is accessible and understandable to ordinary
well-meaning people who identify themselves as White.249 White Network
Economics is only one example of analysis that describes, not oppressors
or supremacists, but ordinary people making ordinary economic decisions
not based on malice or intentional racism and not even conscious of the
racial nature of their behavior, but nonetheless contributing to the
perpetuation of the dominance of Whiteness.

without a leader the same way that collective human behavior builds cities).
247. See GLADWELL, supra note 180, at 3-9, 139 (giving as an example the rise of Hush
Puppies as a fashion trend as a result of contagious human behavior).
248. CHONG, supra note 186, at 1 (discussing “public-spirited collective action” as large
scale activism based on concerns such as peace, women’s issues, the environment, civil
rights and other moral issues).
249. The language of oppression and White supremacy may certainly be accurate and
achieve empowerment and awareness on the part of non-Whites. This is not an insignificant
or unimportant task. Indeed, my own dedication to racial progress has been nourished and
encouraged by various sophisticated analyses of race inequality. However this language is
not designed to accomplish the kind of access that is necessary to bring about broader
change.

